

Black Lives Matter and the Racialized Support for the January 6th Insurrection

By
MATT A. BARRETO,
CLAUDIA ALEGRE,
J. ISAAH BAILEY,
ALEXANDRIA DAVIS,
JOSHUA FERRER,
JOYCE NGUY,
CHRISTOPHER
PALMISANO,
and
CRYSTAL ROBERTSON

Does support for the January 6th insurrection come mostly from concerned citizens worried over illegal voting, or from racists spurred to action by the highly visible Black Lives Matter protests and Donald Trump's 2020 defeat? We field a survey experiment aimed at disentangling links between old and new racial grievances, anti-immigrant beliefs, Black activism, and support for the January 6th insurrection. We find that the people most likely to be supportive of the insurrection are whites who hold negative attitudes toward immigrants and subscribe to white replacement theory. Beliefs about the George Floyd protests also explain January 6th support, above and beyond demographics and other racial and political views. These results are validated by the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey. We also conduct a survey vignette experiment and find that anti-BLM rhetoric spread by Trump and right-wing news sources likely soured opinions on the movement and set the stage for widespread insurrection support.

Keywords: Black Lives Matter; January 6th insurrection; George Floyd protests; white nationalism; anti-immigrant attitudes; antidemocratic beliefs

On January 6, 2021, thousands of Donald Trump supporters gathered at the Ellipse in Washington, DC, to promote his false claims of election fraud and to protest Joe Biden's

Matt A. Barreto is a professor of political science and Chicana/o studies at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), and the faculty director of the Latino Politics & Policy Institute. His research and teaching focuses on the political behavior of racial/ethnic minorities in the U.S. as well as how racial attitudes affect white Americans.

Claudia Alegre is a PhD candidate in political science at UCLA. Her subfield of study is race, ethnicity, and politics with a focus on political psychology and Latine politics. Her dissertation work explores the role of group-level emotions and how contexts of threat impact emotional responses and further affect political engagement.

Correspondence: barretom@ucla.edu

DOI: 10.1177/00027162241228395

victory in the 2020 presidential election. According to analysis of mass media coverage of January 6th by the Berkeley Media Studies Group, the media initially covered the event as a large pro-Trump demonstration or protest, but as more than 2,000 rioters entered the Capitol building, the tone and tenor of coverage soon changed to call it a mob, an insurrection, and a coup (Mejia 2021). While conservative media was slow to call it an insurrection—as demonstrated by prominent Fox News commentator Tucker Carlson going so far as to comment two years later that “very little about Jan. 6 was organized or violent. Surveillance video from inside the Capitol shows mostly peaceful chaos” (Mascaro, Amiri, and Jalonick 2023)—almost all mainstream media denounced the action on January 6, 2021, as an anti-democratic insurrection.

In this article, we examine what explains public support for the January 6th insurrection beyond the few thousand who illegally entered the Capitol. Some conservatives, such as Vice President Mike Pence and South Carolina Senator Lindsey Graham, strongly denounced the actions later that same evening. Others, including President Trump and several far-right media personalities, failed to criticize or even embraced the insurrectionists. We argue that beyond claims of massive voter fraud, pro-white racial attitudes and anti-immigrant sentiment played central roles in explaining why the insurrection took place, why it became violent, and why so many Americans who did not directly participate came to view the insurrection in a positive light. Racial grievance politics

J. Isaiah Bailey is a political science PhD student at UCLA. His research focuses broadly on the psychological aspects of political ideology, as well as Black public opinion and political behavior. Having worked previously within various state-level government bodies and in the non-profit sector, Bailey has spearheaded numerous polling and survey research projects related to the study of race and political behavior.

Alexandria Davis is a fourth-year UCLA PhD student in political science with a concentration in race, ethnicity, and politics. Her research interests include racial and ethnic politics, Black political behavior, political psychology, intersectionality, and voting. Her upcoming dissertation project focuses on a new measure of Black voter apathy.

Joshua Ferrer is a PhD candidate in political science at UCLA. His research focuses on the link between electoral institutions and representation, with an emphasis on U.S. election administration. His work has been published in the American Political Science Review, Representation, and Political Science.

Joyce Nguy is a fourth-year PhD student in the department of political science at UCLA. She studies Asian American political behavior and descriptive representation.

Christopher Palmisano is a PhD student in political science at UCLA, specializing in American politics. His research focuses on partisanship, election administration, public opinion, and political polarization.

Crystal Robertson is a political science PhD candidate at UCLA. Her research examines the role of social identities and their intersections in public opinion of social movements. Her work has been published in the American Political Science Review, Political Behavior, and the Monkey Cage.

formed the centerpiece of Trump's political rhetoric and motivated his central policy goals in office. Therefore, we focus on the core elements of this politics—traditional anti-Black racial resentment, pro-white identity, xenophobia, and white nationalist beliefs—to explain public support for his last-ditch attempt to maintain power.

We also argue that beyond demographics, ideology, and racial attitudes, public attitudes toward the George Floyd protests shaped support for the insurrection. We outline a new theory of racial-status impotence among whites, in which the events and sentiments that directly preceded January 6th influenced support for the insurrection. Racial conservatives had seen coverage of Floyd protesters taking to the streets, and far-right information channels described them as terrorists, looters, Black nationalists, violent, and not American (Hylton 2021; Monroe and Savillo 2021). In contrast to mainstream news coverage, which presented a much more understanding and supportive view of the Floyd protests, far-right coverage attacked, belittled, and criticized Black Lives Matter (BLM) protesters by telling their audiences that the protesters were trying to change America and that real American patriots needed to stand up and fight back (Sullivan 2021).

Additionally, we argue the racial-status impotence experienced by whites was motivated by a tumultuous political timeline of events in 2020 and early 2021: the George Floyd protests, the 2020 presidential election, and the events on January 6th. This timeline informs our decision to make connections regarding public opinion about George Floyd protests and January 6th, but not comparisons, which could create a dangerous false equivalency (Brantley-Jones 2021). We posit that racial conservatives felt powerless to stop the wave of Democratic votes from Black, Latino, Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI), and immigrant communities, which ultimately resulted in Trump's electoral loss. At the same time, accusations and conspiracies surrounding voter fraud, the reinvigoration of white nationalism and pride, and the desperate appeals to keep "American ideals" promulgated by far-right news media and elite rhetoric were rampant following the election cycle.

What is normally a formality and a bipartisan ceremony, the certification of the presidential election results on January 6th turned into what the FBI called an act of domestic terrorism, resulting in nine deaths and 138 injuries to police officers. We suspect that, after the initial shock and horror wore off, many Americans harbored feelings of racial-status impotence and grew to empathize with, if not support, the January 6th insurrection. Using an original national survey, the 2022 Political Unrest Study, we model support for the January 6th insurrection as a function of negative views toward the Floyd protests and of feelings of white status anxiety. We do this to demonstrate that among white Americans, strong rejection of BLM and feelings that whites are being "left behind" are highly correlated with support for the January 6th insurrection. By controlling for other significant variables (including belief in voter fraud, Trump favorability, ideology, social dominance orientation, and system justification), we show that, beyond these expected effects, our key theoretical variables related to Black Lives Matter and white racial-status impotence have an independent association with January 6th "true believers." These results are validated with the 2020 Collaborative

Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS). Finally, in a BLM priming experiment, we demonstrate that far-right critiques did likely spur white Americans to hold more negative views of the Floyd protests. We find a causal link between language used by right-wing media personalities such as Tucker Carlson that likened the Floyd protests to a tyrannical, oppressive riot (Naughtie 2020) and the belief that Floyd protesters were terrorists, Black nationalists, rioters, and insurrectionists. We argue that the extended negative critique of BLM and Floyd protests in 2020 laid the groundwork for a “protest of their own” by ardent Trump supporters, especially those who denounced concepts like white privilege and embraced concepts like white replacement theory.

Racial Attitudes, Anti-Immigrant Views, and White Replacement Theory

Since America’s founding, whites have consistently been the majority racial group in power. As U.S. demographics continue to diversify, however, many non-Hispanic whites feel increasingly threatened due to the perceived erosion of their status as the majority racial group (Jardina 2019; Major, Blodorn, and Blascovich 2018; Mutz 2018; Schildkraut 2007).

Whites’ reactions to the potential political change from these demographic shifts can be better understood through the lens of identity-based theories. Tajfel and Turner’s Social Identity Theory (SIT) and its offshoot, Social Categorization Theory (SCT), suggest that individuals are driven by an innate motivation to maintain positive self-esteem, which can be achieved by forming distinct groups centered around an identity that distinguishes them from other groups. This psychological drive may motivate whites, especially those with a strong racial identity, to privilege their own group and attempt to exclude out-groups in order to maintain positive distinctiveness (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1979).

One way in which whites may attempt to reinforce their status as the prototypical racial group in America is by resisting growing racial diversity and policing the boundaries of what might be considered American (Bai and Federico 2020; Danbold and Huo 2015; Jardina 2019; Schildkraut 2010). This is exemplified by some whites expressing resentment and xenophobia in response to the growing U.S. immigrant population (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Ramirez and Peterson 2020). The theory of racial threat posits that the proximity of whites to large or growing racial and ethnic minority populations can heighten hostility toward out-groups and influence political actions (Enos 2017; Key 1949). This phenomenon has been observed in various settings (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998; Taylor 1998) and among immigrant populations (Hopkins 2010). Additionally, anti-immigrant sentiment has been linked to support for voter restrictions and belief in voter fraud (Udani and Kimball 2018).

To further protect their status and reinforce their positive group image, whites may also exhibit intolerance and prejudice toward out-group members. For instance, support for the Tea Party was rooted in the anxiety some felt as they

perceived the America they know slipping away and being replaced by a more diverse and multicultural society (Parker and Barreto 2013). While the candidacy of Donald Trump did not create these fears and sentiments, his campaign and other political leaders exploited them and made the threat more salient to voters. Trump's rhetoric included statements such as "taking back our country," which alludes to reclaiming a "white America," and promoting anti-immigrant sentiment. By appealing to white voters' fear of replacement and loss of status and by making both blatant and coded racist remarks, he was able to mobilize the support of high-identifying white voters (Major, Blodorn, and Blascovich 2018; Mutz 2018; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018). Trump claimed that the election had been stolen and that the "radical left" would take control of the country. In response to this perceived threat, he urged supporters to "fight like hell" or risk losing the country altogether (Long 2022). His rhetoric served to connect the perceived threat to specific extremist actions, such as storming the seat of government to prevent the certification of the 2020 presidential election.

Trump's Big Lie Rhetoric Focused on Immigrants and Racial Minorities

Trump's efforts to cultivate public distrust in U.S. elections have long centered on the vilification of *illegal* immigrants and minority enclaves (Acosta 2019). This misinformation campaign began in the run-up to the 2016 election, a period during which Trump frequently cited a controversial study that concluded that Democrats had benefited in recent elections from noncitizen voting (Farley 2016; Feldman 2020). In the months following his surprise Electoral College win, Trump repeatedly advanced claims about voter fraud that attributed his loss of the popular vote to what he alleged were millions of illegal votes cast by undocumented immigrants. A "Presidential Advisory Commission on Voter Integrity," established by Trump after his inauguration, disbanded two years later after failing to find any evidence to back up his claims (Tackett and Wines 2018). Even so, Trump recycled these narratives in the wake of his party's 2018 midterm drubbing—when he contended that Democratic gains were driven largely by coordinated efforts to mobilize illegal immigrants as voters—and again in the lead-up to the 2020 election. By this point, Trump's oxymoronic fraud narrative had expanded to encompass alleged "mountains of corruption" that he claimed persisted in Philadelphia, Detroit, and Milwaukee—cities well-known for their large African American populations (Badger 2020). "Detroit and Philadelphia are known as two of the most corrupt political places anywhere in our country—easily," he offered. "They cannot be responsible for engineering the outcome of a presidential race" (Badger 2020). Trump's postelection lawsuits also laser-focused on challenging votes in these largely Black, populous cities. Taken together, these tendencies delineate a clear commitment to the practice of thinly veiled race-baiting whereby un-American actors were the direct cause of Trump's electoral misfortunes.

Trump overlaid these narrative efforts with a sustained practice of soft-pedaling the actions of far-right groups while clearly disdaining counterprotest movements and the Movement for Black Lives. In response to the deadly 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, Trump asserted that there were “very fine people on both sides,” before offering a full-throated denouncement of those he labeled “troublemakers” among the counterprotesters acting in support of removing Confederate monuments from public display. On the eve of a second Unite the Right rally one year later, Trump persisted in his refusal to condemn the actions of white supremacist and neo-Nazi actors and opted instead to “condemn all types of racism and acts of violence.” But in his response to the 2020 protests following the death of Black Minnesota resident George Floyd, Trump adopted a completely different tone and declared to state and local officials that “if you don’t dominate your city and your state, they’re going to walk away with you” and “in Washington we’re going to do something people haven’t seen before.” Trump’s directive for the Proud Boys and other white supremacist groups to “stand back and stand by” during the nationally televised 2020 presidential debate preceded the events of January 6, 2021. Trump’s rhetoric persisted in the wake of those events. While addressing the very mob that had stormed the Capitol earlier that day, Trump concluded his remarks by telling them, “You’re very special,” thus crystalizing the contrast between his portrayal of right-wing extremists and that of the Black Lives Matter protesters he had often labeled “terrorists,” “thugs,” and “anarchists.”

The Link between Black Lives Matter, the Big Lie, and January 6th

Trump, by proxy, allowed some white Americans to express a signified aggrieved identity (as distinct from group-consciousness-centered considerations like white identity politics [Jardina 2019]). Signified aggrieved identity is a sociological form of racial identity (Khanna and Johnson 2010) that describes a sense of self that is antagonized by non-white people and seeks correction of, or retribution for, this aggrieved status. Hochschild’s (2016) focus groups and interviews with white Louisiana Tea Party supporters illustrates this sentiment: expressing anger and frustration toward their status in the U.S., these whites are angered because, despite being hard-working and rule-following, they have been denied the American Dream by a government enabling others to unfairly cut in line. This aggrieved disposition may be associated with gains in governmental distrust and conspiratorial thinking—both central components when considering an individual’s response to the 2020 election and suspicions of voter fraud (Uscinski and Parent 2014; Wolak 2014). The 2020 election intensified this uncertainty among voters who felt the Trump presidency brought them the retribution they deserved. This uncertainty inspired support for the Big Lie, allegations of voter fraud, and, most surprisingly, the events on January 6th at the U.S. Capitol.

A large majority of Republicans and an even larger number of Trump-identified voters believe Trump won the 2020 presidential election, the so-called “Big Lie.” Even after Congress had certified the 2020 election, majorities of Republicans (51 percent) and Trump voters (56 percent) believed that Donald Trump should not concede the election (Jacobson 2021). These polls present overwhelming evidence of the support for the Big Lie and voter fraud within the 2020 presidential election, but the question remains about why these Trump supporters continued to believe this narrative.

Political psychology scholars suggest partisan-motivated reasoning and dual-process models are key to unpacking the belief in the Big Lie. Motivated reasoning is a mechanism in which people interpret new information based on their preexisting beliefs (Kunda 1990). Several scholars find that motivated reasoning along partisan lines significantly impacts an individual’s acceptance of information that has been signaled by the political elites of their preferred party (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014; Enders and Smallpage 2019; Strickland, Taber, and Lodge 2011). In the case of the Big Lie, Republicans are predisposed to accepting even factually inaccurate messages from copartisan elites like President Trump. Additionally, dual-process models can help explain the thinking of Trump supporters. Dual-process theory posits that two different avenues of cognition—implicit and explicit—give rise to our thinking. In grappling with a question, individuals may employ heuristic shortcuts or engage with more reflective cognitive processes to arrive at their belief in the Big Lie (Kahan 2013; Knobloch-Westernwick, Mothes, and Polavin 2017).

Emotions are also relevant to this discussion of how political psychology explains the affordance white Republicans and Trump supporters alike have given to the Big Lie and sheds light on the events of January 6th. As we focus on the specific effects of emotions on political behavior—anger, for example—we see that it can trigger political participation and mobilize people to rectify injustices through protests and social movements (Banks, White, and McKenzie 2019; Lambert, Eadeh, and Hanson 2019; Valentino et al. 2011; Weber 2013). According to Affective Intelligence Theory, anger is motivated by continuous threats and is a response within a precautionary behavior inhibition system (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). Webster asserts that anger is associated with negative partisanship, a result of an increasingly angry political environment that leads members of a party to go against everything associated with the oppositional party (Abramowitz and Webster 2018; Webster 2020). These theories suggest that we might expect to see additional political behaviors associated with anger other than political participation, like distrust in government and undermining of democratic institutions (Albertson and Guiler 2020; Webster 2020). While anger is a significant mobilizer for political action, there is a gap in the feelings of anger experienced by Black and white individuals, with Blacks registering less anger than their white counterparts do (Phoenix 2019). This anger gap leads white Americans to experience a sense of entitlement to make demands from the U.S. government precisely because the government has, historically, responded to their anger. Given this sense of entitlement, it should come as no surprise that, when feeling that they are downtrodden and seeing that their

political leader—one who is finally responsive to their needs—is in jeopardy, they would use any means necessary to maintain his position. In addition, fear over a loss of power or status also has been shown to lead to an increase in racial animus toward racial minorities and to strengthen conservative political attitudes (Craig and Richeson 2014a, 2014b).

In this article, we do not seek to directly compare the events of January 6th and the George Floyd protests. Similar to several media pundits, scholars, and activists engaged in the George Floyd protests, we argue there are important distinctions to be made between these two events (Brantley-Jones 2021; Watson 2021). Whereas the George Floyd protests were meant to undermine white supremacy through a global social movement that occasionally turned to violence, the events of January 6th were an intentional attack on American political institutions that were meant to uphold white supremacy. Republican legislators and Trump supporters alike have attempted to skew the narrative by comparing the two events and describing George Floyd protesters as violent, even though an analysis of 7,750 demonstrations across the country found that 93 percent happened with no violence (Kishi and Jones 2020; Watson 2021). This attempt to establish a false equivalency supports the argument that racial-status impotence is at play in whites' public opinion response to George Floyd protests and that right-wing actors influenced whites' sentiments toward January 6th.

Data and Methods

We fielded an original large-scale representative survey, the 2022 Political Unrest Study, by conducting 1,996 total web interviews in English on the Lucid Marketplace platform from mid-March to April 2022. We dropped all respondents who failed an attention check and, for the purposes of this project, we dropped all non-white respondents. This left us with a total sample size of 1,340 completed responses from self-identified non-Hispanic whites for our main analysis. We asked respondents a range of questions about their demographics, partisanship, ideology, and attitudes toward immigrant and racial minorities.

It is important that studies examining attitudes about the insurrection supplement standard measures of support with additional “soft” support metrics that indicate affinity or sympathy toward individuals who participated in those events and cohere with the tradition of manufacturing innocence for actions associated with white men (Mitchell 2018). Public polling has consistently shown low overall approval for the January 6th insurrection, dating from immediately following the event up to the present day (Gramlich 2022; Lazer et al. 2021; Orth 2023). Even among Republicans, support for the insurrection has generally polled well below established metrics, such as overall favorability for Donald Trump, though much more in line with entities such as QAnon. Our research design allowed us to consider a wide range of stances that individuals might take toward those individuals and events. Therefore, we probed support for the January 6th insurrection by asking respondents which terms and labels they would associate with both

the day's events and its participants. We did the same for the George Floyd protests. Respondents were provided a long list of potential descriptors they might use to describe the January 6th insurrection and the George Floyd protests' events and participants and were allowed to select however many they desired. Importantly, some of these descriptors were positive and implied tacit approval, such as describing the events as a "revolution"¹ or describing the participants as "patriots" or "protesters." Others were negative and implied tacit disapproval, including describing the events as a "riot," a "coup," or an "insurrection," or describing the participants as "rioters," "insurrectionists," or "terrorists." This methodology of evaluating positive and negative descriptors of both events and their participants borrowed from the University of Massachusetts Amherst's April 21 to 23 poll conducted via YouGov (Nteta 2021).

In addition to this battery of questions, the survey embedded a vignette experiment that tested the effect of exposure to information about the Black Lives Matter movement on attitudes toward these protests. Again, we argue that the Black Lives Matter/George Floyd protests, and the way they were framed in the media, activated racial considerations and set the stage for the events that transpired on January 6th. Participants were randomly assigned into one of four treatment conditions. Each treatment involved reading a short paragraph describing the George Floyd protests and seeing the same photo of Black protesters with signs and raised fists. The four treatment conditions varied the language used to describe these protests: activist praise, mainstream praise, right-wing critique, and extreme critique. These treatments convey either a positive or negative framing of BLM protests to varying degrees. Whereas the mainstream praise and right-wing critique reflect the more moderate, middle-of-the-road language mirrored in mainstream liberal or right-wing news outlets, the activist and extreme critique conditions pose the strongest and most extreme wording. The latter two conditions were what we expected to have the greatest impact on our post-treatment dependent variables. After receiving treatment, respondents received both a manipulation and attention check to ensure treatment effectiveness and respondent attentiveness within our survey experiment. Respondents who did not pass the attention check were removed pre-analysis. However, respondents who did not pass the manipulation check were maintained in the analysis, given that this matches the reality of news consumers who may be exposed to disparate framing of BLM but are not attentive enough to have it impact their attitudes.

We used the BLM mainstream praise condition as a control condition for the experiment because we believe this rhetoric is most similar to how George Floyd's murder and the Black Lives Matter protests that followed were presented in the popular media. This condition presents sentiments of George Floyd's murder and the Black Lives Matter movement being inspirational, that is, wanting to encourage valuing human life and to change America for the better. Additionally, it emphasizes that the Black Lives Matter movement embodies American values through its protest aimed at improving policing and the justice system. We argue that these sentiments are similar to what Americans were exposed to by prominent media outlets like CNN, *The New York Times*, NBC News, and Politico

following Floyd's passing in May 2020 and up to the following year (Burch et al. 2021; Cheung 2020; CNN 2021; Garcia 2021; *Politico Magazine* 2021; Singh and Lakhani 2020). The common language utilized within the various articles includes referring to the interaction between George Floyd and police officer Derek Chauvin as a "killing" or "murder," as well as describing the events Black Lives Matter held in response as "protests" that invigorated a movement about improving "policing" and "racial injustice" in this country. It does not go as far as discussing abolishing the police or disparaging George Floyd, which we used in the treatment conditions.

Following the survey vignette experiment, a manipulation check asked if respondents had read an article in support of Black Lives Matter to assess if respondents had read and interpreted our experimental manipulation. Respondents within the Mainstream and Activist Praise conditions were expected to respond "true," while those who received the Mainstream and Extreme Critique were expected to respond "false." Aside from the soft support probes of both BLM and January 6th, we included several other outcome measures, including voter fraud, voter fraud framed in the context of January 6th, and a voter fraud necessity measure. The voter fraud outcome measures asked about respondents' awareness of voter fraud and belief that it impacted the 2020 presidential election. Digging deeper into respondents' beliefs about voter fraud, we asked questions that assess if individuals feel elections are rigged to support a specific political party, if respondents believe their ballot was counted as intended generally and specifically within their state, and if preventing voter fraud is so important that election officials should make it harder for others to vote. Our post-treatment measures included racial resentment, anti-immigrant attitudes, COVID conspiracy, external and internal efficacy, replacement theory, conspiracy ideation, social dominance, authoritarianism, and trust in government.

We complemented our observational survey findings from the 2022 Political Unrest Study using the 2020 CMPS (n.d.).

Results

What explains public support for the January 6th insurrection among whites? In Table 1, we display the output of regressions testing the relationship between respondents using positive terms to describe the January 6th Capitol insurrection and a series of political, demographic, and ideological variables for a white population sample. In all five columns, we employ sampling weights to make the sample representative of the adult U.S. white population. The first four columns employ logistic regressions. Columns 1 and 2 test binary responses to positive descriptors of the January 6th participants: describing them as "revolutionaries" in the first column and as "patriots" in the second column. Columns 3 and 4 test binary positive descriptors for the January 6th events: column 3 describing it as a "revolution" and column 4 as a "protest." Column 5 employs a 0 to 4 count of the number of positive descriptors used to describe the January 6th event and its participants and is run using a Poisson regression.

TABLE 1
Description of George Floyd Affects Description of January 6th

	Dependent Variable				
	Jan 6 “revolutionaries”	Jan 6 “patriots”	Jan 6 “revolution”	Jan 6 “protest”	Jan 6 positive count
	Logistic	Logistic	Logistic	Logistic	Poisson
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Floyd protesters neg count	0.252*** (0.064)	0.368*** (0.063)	0.216*** (0.061)	0.380*** (0.057)	0.157*** (0.021)
Fraud changed results	-0.082 (0.079)	0.400*** (0.078)	-0.031 (0.072)	0.160*** (0.059)	0.068*** (0.027)
Trump favorability	-0.026 (0.101)	0.338*** (0.098)	-0.114 (0.093)	0.280*** (0.078)	0.079*** (0.034)
Whites being replaced	0.196** (0.089)	0.267*** (0.083)	0.196*** (0.083)	0.129* (0.069)	0.107*** (0.029)
Immigrants burden	-0.002 (0.088)	0.172** (0.082)	0.154* (0.083)	-0.023 (0.068)	0.040 (0.029)
Racial resentment	-0.070 (0.116)	-0.181 (0.116)	-0.235** (0.109)	0.069 (0.087)	-0.028 (0.039)
Education	-0.005 (0.069)	0.051 (0.067)	-0.034 (0.064)	0.024 (0.053)	-0.002 (0.023)
Age	0.003 (0.006)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.008* (0.005)	-0.001 (0.002)
Female	-0.059 (0.180)	-0.297* (0.172)	-0.153 (0.167)	0.001 (0.137)	-0.053 (0.060)
Income	-0.005 (0.031)	-0.044 (0.031)	0.015 (0.029)	-0.008 (0.024)	-0.002 (0.011)
SDO	0.216* (0.113)	0.042 (0.105)	0.056 (0.105)	0.077 (0.088)	0.053 (0.036)
Conservative	-0.059 (0.079)	-0.010 (0.076)	0.095 (0.072)	0.125** (0.063)	0.033 (0.026)
Republican	-0.030 (0.128)	-0.087 (0.125)	-0.135 (0.119)	-0.177* (0.101)	-0.057 (0.043)
Evangelical	0.293 (0.181)	0.004 (0.169)	0.388** (0.167)	0.047 (0.142)	0.099* (0.059)
Constant	-2.438*** (0.545)	-4.799*** (0.561)	-2.559*** (0.509)	-2.516*** (0.420)	-1.093*** (0.184)
Observations	1,214	1,214	1,214	1,214	1,214
Log likelihood	-474.667	-477.339	-536.228	-704.607	-1,439.323

* $p < .1$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$.

"Floyd protesters neg count" is a 0 to 6 count of negative descriptors used to describe the Black Lives Matter protesters (as "rioters", "insurrectionists" or terrorists") and events (as an "insurrection", "riot", or "coup"). "SDO" is short for social dominance orientation.

In all five specifications, we see substantially and statistically significant results for a range of demographic and political variables. Respondents who ascribe to the white replacement theory are much more likely, on average, to positively describe the January 6th insurrection. Those who think immigrants are a burden also tend to view the insurrection in a positive light. In three of the five specifications, there is a strong relationship between belief in the Big Lie—that there was enough voter fraud in the 2020 presidential election to change its outcome—and support for the insurrection. As expected, Trump favorability, conservative ideology, and social dominance orientation are also correlated with more positive descriptions of the insurrection. The models also include controls for education, age, gender, evangelicalism, racial resentment, and party identification.

Even after accounting for all of these variables, respondents' views toward the George Floyd protesters powerfully shape their views toward the insurrection. In every single model, a variable summing together six negative descriptors of the Black Lives Matter movement's participants (as "rioters," "insurrectionists," and "terrorists") and events (as an "insurrection," "riot," and "coup") describes a significant amount of the variation in their descriptors of the January 6th insurrection. Respondents' BLM views are a more powerful and consistent correlate of their insurrection views than is their belief in the Big Lie, their political ideology, their partisan identity, or even their attitudes toward President Trump.

In Table 2, we show that respondents' attitudes toward the George Floyd protests also explain variation in anti-democratic beliefs. Employing the same set of controls and ordered logit regressions, we find that when respondents have more negative attitudes toward the BLM protests, they are more likely to support the Big Lie ("Do you believe there was voter fraud in the presidential election at the level which would have changed the results and made Donald Trump the winner?") (Fraud changed results) and more likely to agree that state legislatures should have the power to overturn the public vote if there were "too many fraudulent ballots" (State leg overturn). As in Table 1, the link persists even after accounting for a range of political and demographic variables.

We complement these findings by running similar specifications using the 2020 CMPS. In Table 3, column 1, we run a logistic regression on the binary response to describing January 6th as a protest rather than an insurrection (Jan 6 was protest). Columns 2 to 4 employ Poisson regressions. In column 2, respondents answer whether stopping the certification of results was protecting or harming the democratic process (Stop cert protecting), in column 3 they answer the extent to which Trump was not at fault for January 6th (Trump not at fault), and in column 4 respondents state that January 6th was not caused by white supremacy (Jan 6 not white sup). Across all columns, positive coefficients indicate support for the insurrection. A variable asking respondents about their opposition to Black Lives Matter is used to capture beliefs about the George Floyd protests. Rather than a question about white replacement theory ("I am worried that non-white immigrants are replacing America's white majority"), we substitute two similar ones: the belief that white privilege is "OK" and the belief that white nationalists support the respondents' vision of American society. We substitute a question asking whether respondents oppose immigrant citizenship for a

TABLE 2
Description of George Floyd Affects Views of Fraud and Overturning Elections

	Dependent Variable	
	Fraud changed results	State leg overturn
	(1)	(2)
Floyd protesters neg count	0.304*** (0.046)	0.314*** (0.045)
Trump favorability	0.916*** (0.066)	0.406*** (0.061)
Whites being replaced	0.085 (0.060)	0.138** (0.059)
Immigrants burden	0.210*** (0.058)	0.196*** (0.058)
Black temp	0.019 (0.076)	−0.016 (0.073)
Education	0.021 (0.046)	−0.057 (0.043)
Age	−0.010*** (0.004)	−0.012*** (0.004)
Female	−0.130 (0.117)	−0.039 (0.113)
Income	0.015 (0.020)	0.044** (0.019)
SDO	0.083 (0.075)	0.138* (0.074)
Conservative	0.133** (0.056)	0.053 (0.053)
Republican	0.208** (0.086)	−0.005 (0.083)
Evangelical	0.346*** (0.122)	0.453*** (0.119)
Observations	1,188	1,188
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)	2908.802	3222.699

* $p < .1$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$.
“Floyd protesters neg count” is a 0 to 6 count of negative descriptors used to describe the Black Lives Matter protesters (as “rioters”, “insurrectionists” or terrorists”) and events (as an “insurrection”, “riot”, or “coup”). “SDO” is short for social dominance orientation.

question on the 2022 Political Unrest Study describing them as a burden. Finally, we include a system-justification index to test the theory that motivated reasoning about the depiction of the insurrection as overly negative explains positive sentiments toward the event. This index is a composite of three questions: “Racial and ethnic minorities can get ahead in the United States if they work hard”; “Most people who want to get ahead can make it if they are willing to work hard”; and “It is possible to start out poor in this country, work hard, and become well-off.” We again subset the sample to whites and employ sampling weights to get a representative sample of the adult U.S. population.

The results are generally similar to Table 1. The belief that white privilege is OK strongly correlates with support for the insurrection across all four specifications. Additionally, support for white nationalism and opposition to immigrant citizenship also correlate with support for the insurrection. As in Table 1, even accounting for a wide variety of political and demographic variables, opposition to Black Lives Matter strongly predicts insurrection support.

Finally, we ran a survey experiment in the 2022 Political Unrest Study to test whether negative portrayals of the Black Lives Matter protests in the summer

TABLE 3
CMPS also Shows BLM Beliefs Influence Views of Insurrection

	Dependent Variable			
	Jan 6 was protest	Stop cert protecting	Trump not at fault	Jan 6 not white sup
	Logistic	Poisson	Poisson	Poisson
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Oppose BLM	0.187*** (0.050)	0.056** (0.023)	0.022 (0.015)	0.042*** (0.015)
Fraud changed results	0.225*** (0.045)	0.164*** (0.022)	0.065*** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.013)
Trump favorability	1.369*** (0.169)	0.755*** (0.089)	0.471*** (0.056)	0.102° (0.053)
White privilege OK	0.336*** (0.062)	0.066** (0.028)	0.032° (0.019)	0.077*** (0.018)
Support white nationalism	0.134*** (0.029)	0.042*** (0.012)	0.012 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)
Oppose immigrant citizenship	0.130*** (0.039)	0.004 (0.016)	0.016 (0.011)	0.007 (0.011)
Racial resentment	-0.791*** (0.294)	0.190 (0.130)	0.008 (0.086)	0.032 (0.083)
Education	0.048 (0.035)	0.014 (0.014)	0.001 (0.010)	0.001 (0.009)
Age	-0.0005 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002° (0.001)
Female	-0.048 (0.093)	0.013 (0.039)	0.016 (0.027)	0.014 (0.026)
Income	-0.005 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
System justification	1.015*** (0.250)	-0.010 (0.120)	-0.084 (0.077)	0.011 (0.074)
Conservative	0.359° (0.217)	0.272*** (0.092)	0.108° (0.063)	0.110° (0.062)
Republican	0.126° (0.075)	0.014 (0.038)	0.020 (0.024)	-0.003 (0.023)
Evangelical	-0.249** (0.121)	-0.010 (0.045)	-0.005 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.032)
Constant	-3.475*** (0.370)	-1.543*** (0.163)	0.117 (0.107)	0.307*** (0.104)
Observations	3,199	3,199	3,199	3,199
Log likelihood	-1,569.201	-3,143.517	-4,094.786	-4,313.348

° $p < .1$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$.

and fall of 2020 were key to souring public opinion on the movement and setting the stage for the Big Lie and the January 6th insurrection. As described in our data and methods section, we use mainstream praise language as our reference category, since this is the rhetoric most widely circulated by the news media. In Figure 1, we present the treatment effects by displaying the main outcome of interest—a count of the number of negative descriptors respondents use to describe the George Floyd protests—grouped by treatment condition, with 95 percent confidence interval bars. It is clear that respondents receiving the BLM critique and extreme critique conditions were more likely to ascribe negative descriptors to the protest movement.

In Table 4, we show the results of Poisson regressions comparing respondents’ average opposition to the George Floyd protests after reading mainstream praise rhetoric to responses after reading three other randomly assigned rhetorical conditions: activist praise for the movement, a critique of the movement as might be found in Fox News, and an extreme critique rhetoric. Column 1 displays output of the treatment effects with mainstream praise as the comparison group, and

FIGURE 1
Experimental Outcome Group Means




TABLE 4
Priming Experiment Results: Negative BLM Protest Rhetoric Sours
Opinions on the Movement

Dependent Variable		
George Floyd negative count		
	(1)	(2)
BLM activist praise	0.061 (0.071)	0.066 (0.071)
BLM critique	0.223*** (0.069)	0.198*** (0.069)
BLM extreme critique	0.239*** (0.067)	0.225*** (0.067)
Fraud changed results		0.105*** (0.023)
Trump favorability		−0.014 (0.030)
Whites being replaced		0.005 (0.025)
Immigrants burden		0.073*** (0.024)
Black temp		0.259*** (0.032)
Education		0.023 (0.020)
Age		0.005*** (0.002)
Female		−0.008 (0.050)
Income		−0.003 (0.009)
SDO		−0.013 (0.030)
Conservative		0.028 (0.024)
Republican		0.089** (0.038)
Evangelical		0.043 (0.050)
Constant	0.472*** (0.049)	−0.769*** (0.162)
Observations	958	958
Log likelihood	−1,644.278	−1,445.377

p* < .05. *p* < .01.
BLM mainstream praise is the comparison group. “SDO” is short for social dominance orientation. George Floyd negative count is a 0 to 6 count of negative descriptors used to describe the Black Lives Matter protesters (as “rioters”, “insurrectionists” or terrorists”) and events (as an “insurrection”, “riot”, or “coup”). “SDO” is short for social dominance orientation.

column 2 displays output with the same controls used in Table 1 regressions. The dependent variable is a summed count of George Floyd protest negative descriptors used in row 1 of Table 1.

We find substantial and statistically significant effect sizes for negative BLM rhetoric. In short, vignettes that criticized the George Floyd protesters soured respondent opinions of the BLM movement. Combined with the observational findings, this negative rhetoric was able to prime a significant segment of the public to distrust racial minorities and immigrants and to respond to Trump's rhetoric about a stolen election and call to action to stop the certification of Joe Biden's victory.

Conclusion

We use the 2022 Political Unrest Study, a large-scale original survey experiment, and the 2020 CMPS to assess how racial attitudes, and specifically attitudes about BLM protests, affected whether people support the actions of the January 6th insurrection. We find empirical evidence that belief in white replacement theory, anti-immigrant sentiments, belief in voter fraud in the 2020 election, and Trump favorability predict support for the January 6th insurrection. On top of that, we find, even after accounting for these variables, a positive and statistically significant relationship between views of the George Floyd protests and the insurrection. We find, too, that respondents with negative views of BLM and the George Floyd protests also correlated with a subscription to anti-democratic beliefs.

Our experiment revealed that the various media's framing of the BLM protests impacts respondents' perceptions of BLM. Overall, we find evidence that this media framing activated existing extreme racial attitudes and sentiments, which helps explain why some continue to support the insurrection. This analysis of George Floyd/BLM protests and January 6th is not a comparison of the two events. Instead, we posit a connection between the media discussion of the George Floyd protests in 2020 and the events on January 6th, a connection that increased sentiments of racial-status impotence amongst whites. Future analysis should acknowledge the false equivalency that is made between the singular event of January 6th and the numerous protest activities within the Black Lives Matter movement that was further emboldened by police killings of individuals like George Floyd and Breonna Taylor. This kind of analysis could be important because comparisons between the two may well influence the treatment of Black Lives Matter protesters in the future—especially in light of assumptions about police violence and the disposition of the prosecution of January 6th participants. To address the growing extremism in the U.S., it is crucial to study how individuals come to support extremist ideologies, especially in a context of racial empowerment and demographic change.

Note

1. We make the argument that "revolution" generally takes on a positive connotation, since it is typically denoted in the American context with positive historical change (e.g., the American Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the Agricultural Revolution). While revolution may potentially denote a negative

connotation for a few, historical context and usage of the word *revolution* in American life serve as evidence for our treating the term as a positive.

References

- Abrajano, Marisa, and Zoltan L. Hajnal. 2015. *White backlash: Immigration, race, and American politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Abramowitz, Alan I., and Steven W. Webster. 2018. Negative partisanship: Why Americans dislike parties but behave like rabid partisans. *Political Psychology* 39 (S1): 119–35.
- Acosta, Jim. 11 June 2019. How Trump's "fake news" rhetoric has gotten out of control. *CNN Politics*. Available from www.cnn.com.
- Albertson, Bethany, and Kimberly Guiler. 2020. Conspiracy theories, election rigging, and support for democratic norms. *Research & Politics* 7 (3): 2053168020959859.
- Badger, Emily. 16 November 2020. The cities central to fraud conspiracy theories didn't cost Trump the election. *New York Times*.
- Bai, Hui, and Christopher M. Federico. 2020. Collective existential threat mediates white population decline's effect on defensive reactions. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* 23 (3): 361–77.
- Banks, Antoine J., Ismail K. White, and Brian D. McKenzie. 2019. Black politics: How anger influences the political actions Blacks pursue to reduce racial inequality. *Political Behavior* 41 (4): 917–43.
- Bolsen, Toby, James N. Druckman, and Fay Lomax Cook. 2014. The influence of partisan motivated reasoning on public opinion. *Political Behavior* 36 (2): 235–62.
- Brantley-Jones, Kiara. 16 January 2021. False equivalency between Black Lives Matter and Capitol siege: Experts, advocates. *ABC News*.
- Burch, Audra D. S., Amy Harmon, Sabrina Tavernise, and Emily Badger. 20 April 2021. The death of George Floyd reignited a movement. What happens now? *New York Times*.
- Cheung, Helier. 8 June 2020. George Floyd death: Why U.S. protests are so powerful this time. *BBC*.
- CNN. 21 May 2021. Photos: How George Floyd's death reignited a movement. *CNN*.
- Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS). n.d. *2020 survey*. Los Angeles, CA: University of California, Los Angeles. Available from <https://cmgpsurvey.org/2020-survey>.
- Craig, Maureen A., and Jennifer A. Richeson. 2014a. More diverse yet less tolerant? How the increasingly diverse racial landscape affects white Americans' racial attitudes. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 40 (6): 750–61.
- Craig, Maureen A., and Jennifer A. Richeson. 2014b. On the precipice of a "majority-minority" America: Perceived status threat from the racial demographic shift affects white Americans' political ideology. *Psychological Science* 25 (6): 1189–97.
- Danbold, Felix, and Yuen J. Huo. 2015. No longer "all-American"? Whites' defensive reactions to their numerical decline. *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 6 (2): 210–18.
- Enders, Adam M., and Steven M. Smallpage. 2019. Informational cues, partisan-motivated reasoning, and the manipulation of conspiracy beliefs. *Political Communication* 36 (1): 83–102.
- Enos, Ryan D. 2017. *The space between us: Social geography and politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Farley, Robert. 19 October 2016. Trump's bogus voter fraud claims. *FactCheck.org*. Available from www.factcheck.org (accessed 7 July 2023).
- Feldman, Max. 2020. 10 voter fraud lies debunked. New York, NY: Brennan Center for Justice. Available from www.brennancenter.org (accessed 7 July 2023).
- Garcia, Michelle. 25 May 2021. The monumental impact of George Floyd's death on Black America. *NBC News*.
- Gramlich, John. 4 January 2022. A look back at Americans' reactions to the Jan. 6 riot at the U.S. Capitol. Pew Research Center. Available from www.pewresearch.org (accessed 7 April 2023).
- Green, Donald P., Dara Z. Strolovitch, and Janelle S. Wong. 1998. Defended neighborhoods, integration, and racially motivated crime. *American Journal of Sociology* 104 (2): 372–403.
- Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 2016. *Strangers in their own land: Anger and mourning on the American right*. New York, NY: The New Press.

- Hopkins, Daniel J. 2010. Politicized places: Explaining where and when immigrants provoke local opposition. *American Political Science Review* 104 (1): 40–60.
- Hylton, Garfield. 30 June 2021. New study says Fox News waged war on Black Lives Matter protests. *Momentum*. Available from momentum.medium.com (accessed 5 July 2023).
- Jacobson, Gary C. 2021. Donald Trump's big lie and the future of the Republican Party. *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 51 (2): 273–89.
- Jardina, Ashley. 2019. *White identity politics*. 1st ed. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Kahan, Dan M. 2013. Ideology, motivated reasoning, and cognitive reflection. *Judgment and Decision Making* 8 (4): 407–24.
- Key, Valdimer Orlando. 1949. *Southern politics in state and nation*. New York, NY: A.A. Knopf.
- Khanna, Nikki, and Cathryn Johnson. 2010. Passing as Black: Racial identity work among biracial Americans. *Social Psychology Quarterly* 73 (4): 380–97.
- Kishi, Roudabeh, and Sam Jones. 3 September 2020. Demonstrations and political violence in America: New data for summer 2020. *ACLEd*. Available from acleddata.com (accessed 5 July 2023).
- Knobloch-Westerwick, Silvia, Cornelia Mothes, and Nick Polavin. 2017. Confirmation bias, ingroup bias, and negativity bias in selective exposure to political information. *Communication Research* 47 (1): 104–24.
- Kunda, Ziva. 1990. The case of motivated reasoning. *Psychological Bulletin* 108 (3): 480–98.
- Lambert, Alan J., Fade R. Eadeh, and Emily J. Hanson. 2019. Anger and its consequences for judgment and behavior: Recent developments in social and political psychology. In *Advances in experimental social psychology*, Vol. 59, ed. James M. Olson, 103–73. Cambridge, MA: Academic Press.
- Lazer, David, Matthew A. Baum, Katherine Ognyanova, Matthew Simonson, Jon Green, James Druckman, Adina Gitomer, Jennifer Lin, Roy H. Perlins, Mauricio Santillana, and Alexi Quintana. 2021. The COVID states project #39: Public attitudes towards the storming of the Capitol building. *OSF Preprints*. Available from <https://osf.io/preprints/osf/3qfs9>.
- Long, Colleen. 19 February 2022. Judge rejects effort by Trump to toss Jan. 6 lawsuits. *AP News*.
- Major, Brenda, Alison Blodorn, and Gregory Major Blascovich. 2018. The threat of increasing diversity: Why many white Americans support Trump in the 2016 presidential election. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 21 (6): 931–40.
- Marcus, George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. 2000. *Affective intelligence and political judgment*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Mascaro, Lisa, Farnoush Amiri, and Mary Clare Jalonick. 7 March 2023. Tucker Carlson amplifies Jan. 6 lies with GOP-provided video. *AP News*.
- Mejia, Pamela. 8 January 2021. Protest? Riot? Insurrection? Examining the news from January 6—and where journalism goes from here. *Berkeley Media Studies Group Blog*. Available from www.bmsg.org (accessed 29 June 2023).
- Mitchell, Koritha. 2018. Identifying white mediocrity and know-your-place aggression: A form of self-care. *African American Review* 51 (4): 253–62.
- Monroe, Tyler, and Robert Savillo. 2021. Fox News has attacked Black Lives Matter over 400 times in a 6-month period. Washington, DC: Media Matters for America. Available from www.mediamatters.org (accessed 5 July 2023).
- Mutz, Diana C. 2018. Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 115 (19): e4330–39.
- Naughtie, Andrew. 28 May 2020. Fox News host Tucker Carlson calls Minneapolis protests “a form of tyranny.” *The Independent*.
- Nteta, Tatishe. 2021. One year later, new UMass Amherst poll finds continued national political division over the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Amherst. Available from www.umass.edu/news (accessed 5 July 2023).
- Orth, Taylor. 4 January 2023. Most Americans—but fewer than in 2021—disapprove of the January 6 Capitol takeover. *YouGov*. Available from today.yougov.com (accessed 7 April 2023).
- Parker, Christopher S., and Matt A. Barreto. 2013. *Change they can't believe in: The Tea Party and reactionary politics in America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Phoenix, Davin L. 2019. *The anger gap: How race shapes emotion in politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Politico Magazine*. 23 May 2021. What George Floyd changed. *Politico*.

- Ramirez, Mark D., and David A. M. Peterson. 2020. *Ignored racism: White animus toward Latinos*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2007. Defining American identity in the twenty-first century: How much “there” is there? *Journal of Politics* 69 (3): 597–615.
- Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2010. *Americanism in the twenty-first century: Public opinion in the age of immigration*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Sides, John, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck. 2018. *Identity crisis: The 2016 presidential campaign and the battle for the meaning of America*. Illustrated ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Singh, Maanvi, and Nina Lakhani. 7 June 2020. George Floyd killing: Peaceful protests sweep America as calls for racial justice reach new heights. *The Guardian*.
- Strickland, April, Charles Taber, and Milton Lodge. 2011. Motivated reasoning and public opinion. *Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law* 36 (6): 935–44.
- Sullivan, Margaret. 7 April 2021. Perspective: How right-wing media keeps smearing George Floyd with the racist “no angel” narrative. *Washington Post*.
- Tackett, Michael, and Michael Wines. 3 January 2018. Trump disbands commission on voter fraud. *New York Times*.
- Tajfel, Henri. 1978. Social categorization, social identity, and social comparison. In *Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations*, ed. Henri Tajfel, 61–76. London: Academic Press.
- Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. 1979. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In *The social psychology of intergroup relations*, eds. William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel, 33–47. Monterrey, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.
- Taylor, Marylee C. 1998. How white attitudes vary with the racial composition of local populations: Numbers count. *American Sociological Review* 63 (4): 512–35.
- Udani, Adriano, and David C. Kimball. 2018. Immigrant resentment and voter fraud beliefs in the U.S. electorate. *American Politics Research* 46 (3): 402–33.
- Uscinski, Joseph E., and Joseph M. Parent. 2014. *American conspiracy theories*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Valentino, Nicholas A., Ted Brader, Eric W. Groenendyk, Krysha Gregorowicz, and Vincent L. Hutchings. 2011. Election night’s alright for fighting: The role of emotions in political participation. *Journal of Politics* 73 (1): 156–70.
- Watson, Julie. 14 January 2021. Comparison between Capitol siege, BLM protests is denounced. *AP News*.
- Weber, Christopher. 2013. Emotions, campaigns, and political participation. *Political Research Quarterly* 66 (2): 414–28.
- Webster, Steven W. 2020. *American rage: How anger shapes our politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Wolak, Jennifer. 2014. How campaigns promote the legitimacy of elections. *Electoral Studies* 34:205–15.