The Effect of Workload on Public Official Retention: Evidence from Local Election Officials [*]

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Abstract

Can reducing workloads for public officials lead to increased retention? Surveys have long shown a link between higher reported employee workloads and retirement intentions. Historic disinvestment in local, state, and federal public sectors has resulted in growing concerns that increased workloads will make finding and keeping talent even harder. These concerns are particularly acute in election administration, where recent studies have shown a sharp increase in the departures of those who run America's elections. Are heavy workloads contributing to this exodus and can election date consolidation help improve retention? Rather than relying on survey data as most prior studies of workload and retention have done, I leverage seven years of national voter file data spanning 2014-2020 to calculate the yearly number of elections local election officials administer in each county, then combine this with panel data on election official turnover and employ both cross-sectional and difference-in-differences designs to estimate the effect of changes in election workload on retention. I find that the workload of local election officials in the U.S. is high—with the average state's official overseeing between 2 and 3 Election Days every single year. I fail to find a link between fewer Election Days and increased election official retention.

1 Introduction

Historical long-term disinvestment in state and local government combined with increasing populations and expanding law books has resulted in growing workloads handled by fewer employees with salaries that are not keeping up with the private sector.[1] With the current administration's move to dismantle the federal bureaucracy, these concerns have now spread across all levels of government. This makes understanding how to best retain public officials more important than ever.

A large body of economics and public administration literature have found evidence for a link between manageable workloads and retention of employees, including for jobs such as teachers (Barmby 2006; Chiong, Menzies, and Parameshwaran 2017; Oke et al. 2016; Wang, Hall, and Rahimi 2015), health workers (Buykx et al. 2010; Darbyshire et al. 2021; Lock and Carrieri 2022; Pearson et al. 2006; Verma et al. 2016), police officers (Davies et al. 2024; Stotland and Pendleton 1989; Wilson et al. 2023), and even electoral management bodies (James 2019). However, these studies have almost exclusively relied on self-reported survey measures of both reported workloads and retirement intentions rather than actual administrative data on work burden and employee departures.

This paper studies the workload-retention relationship for election officials, a group of public officials that have come under particular scrutiny in recent years and for which retention is of increasing import. Turnover among election officials has been growing over the past two decades, and especially over the past few years. According to Ferrer and Thompson (2025), the four-year turnover rate of local election officials in the U.S. increased from 28% in 2004 to 41% in 2024, a nearly 50 percent overall increase. While the recent spike in turnover have been attributed to a tumultuous political environment and hostility against these officials,[2] these cannot explain the long-term growth in turnover. One proposed reason for the longer-term trend is the increasing workload demands of the job over the past two

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[1] https://closup.umich.edu/sites/closup/files/2023-02/mpps-workforce-2022.pdf
[2] https://evic.reed.edu/2024-evic-leo-survey-report/

decades, especially the growing complexity of administering each individual election (Ferrer, Thompson, and Orey 2024; Gronke et al. 2024).

In order to study the effect of variations in workload on retention, this paper goes beyond survey-based data by utilizing actual administrative records of workload and retention. I use seven years of nationwide voter file data, a collection of millions of state voting records, to calculate the number of unique election dates local election officials administer each year. I link this data with data on election official turnover and employ both cross-sectional and panel analyses. I find that election officials oversee an average of two Election Days every single year, with some jurisdictions seeing an average of over 10 Election Days a year. I do not find clear evidence that places that administer more elections tend to have lower turnover rates or that fewer election dates improves election official retention.

2   Why Might Fewer Election Dates Increase Election Official Retention?

The United States is an outlier in both the frequency and complexity of its elections. Unlike most countries where federal elections occur every few years, U.S. voters cast ballots at multiple levels of government—federal, state, county, municipal, and special jurisdictions— often in separate contests. Primary and runoff elections further add to the cycle, as do special elections to fill vacancies.

Academic research has long focused on the potential fatiguing effects of too many elections on voters (Boyd 1981; Franklin and Hobolt 2011; Garmann 2017; Kostelka et al. 2023; Rallings, Thrasher, and Borisyuk 2003; Schakel and Dandoy 2014). If people are asked to come to the polls too often, they are less likely to show up each time, potentially leading to unrepresentative outcomes. This is especially the case for lower-salience offices and ballot propositions, leading off-cycle local elections to produce particularly unrepresentative elec-

torates (Anzia 2013, 2021; Berry and Gersen 2010; Hajnal and Trounstine 2005; Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2022, 2024).

What has garnered less attention is the effect frequent elections have on the election officials in charge of administering them. Each election, officials are typically expected to update lists of eligible registered voters, select polling locations, recruit and train poll workers, program and test voting equipment, verify candidates' eligibility, write and print ballots, distribute resources to polling locations, communicate dates and voting rules to voters, ensure candidate compliance with electioneering and campaign finance laws, oversee Election Day voting, and tabulate and certify election results. Election officials also must administer absentee and early in-person voting, if applicable, distribute overseas and military ballots, communicate with media, and ensure all tasks are completed within budget. Additionally, each election requires officials to adhere to a vast array of federal and state laws.

Packed election schedules not only add to the stress of the job, but take time away from important duties undertaken between each election, such as registering voters and cleaning the voter rolls, attending professional trainings, recruiting and training staff and volunteer poll workers, and planning the next election to ensure a smooth, accessible experience for all eligible voters.

According to polling data from the EVIC's 2024 LEO Survey, local election officials typically report working more than 40 hours per week during peak election periods, which can last upwards of 3 months for a single Election Day.[3] In the least populous jurisdictions, the proportionate increase in the election-related work of officials during election periods is 900%, compared to their election work during non-election periods. This puts incredible strain on these officials, especially since they also typically handle non-election duties and a majority of jurisdictions with less than 5,000 people have no full-time election staff. The vast majority of election officials report that their workload has increased over the past four years, both due to actual election administration duties and navigating an environment of

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[3] https://evic.reed.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/2024-EVIC-LEO-Survey-Result-Report-Final-Source-File-v13.pdf

increased public records requests and citizen complaints. These factors likely contribute to election officials' inability to leave problems at work. This evidence led the Brennan Center and Bipartisan Policy Center in a 2021 report to recommend consolidating the timing of elections so they occur concurrently rather than throughout the year.[4] The logic behind this recommendation is that election date consolidation will reduce the intense election season workloads officials reported in the EVIC/Reed College survey data.

Election date consolidation refers to the joining of separate elections together on the same date. It can take a number of forms. States can consolidate multiple levels of government into the same election, such as holding congressional, state, and county officer elections on the same date. They can also run all elections on the federal schedule, which tends to have the highest impact on voter turnout. States can reduce the number of special elections by holding these concurrently with regularly scheduled contests. Finally, states can also select alternatives to runoff elections to ensure a majoritarian outcome. Alaska, Hawaii, and Maine employ ranked choice voting for some contests, which is also known as "instant-runoff voting" for mathematically simulating what would happen in a runoff election.

Previous scholarship has uncovered a number of benefits to consolidating election dates, including increased voter turnout (Anzia 2013; Ferrer and Thorning 2023), more accountable politicians (Payson 2017), and better representation (Dynes, Hartney, and Hayes 2021; Hajnal and Trounstine 2005). Additional, election officials have reported increasing workloads as a reason for difficulties in hiring and retention of their jobs (Manson and Gronke 2025; Roberts and Greenberger 2024). However, as with most of the broader political science and public administration literature (Ali 2019), the connection has depended on surveys asking public officials' turnover intent rather than the actual record of whether they left or not (James 2019). Rather than relying on self-reports of workload and turnover intentions, this study relies on actual administrative records of workloads and turnover to draw its empirical conclusions.

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[4]https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/election-officials-under-attack

3 Data and Methods

Virtually all previous work studying the effects of workload on turnover use survey-based measures of both sides of the equation. Employees are asked for their perceptions of how much they work and their retirement intentions. However, there is no guarantee that one's perceptions of workload match their actual workload, nor that an intention to retire or stay on translates into what an official actually does. Case in point, Ferrer and Thompson (2025) identify substantial discrepancies between election officials' reported retirement intentions and whether they actually left their job.

This paper improves upon the link between workload and retention by using administrative data to measure the actual record of how many elections officials administered in a given year and whether officials departed their jobs.

3.1 Calculating Election Official Workload

I use two proxies for election official workload: the number of different Election Days in their jurisdiction each year, and the number of votes cast per voter age population (VAP). Both are calculated using nationwide voter file data from L2 that spans 2014 to 2020. Following best practices (Kim and Fraga 2022), I list the dates of state voter files used in Table A.2 in the online appendix. All state voter files record individual voter participation histories, indicating whether a ballot was cast by each voter on every election date in the state. The number of different Election Days captures the workload that comes with any election date, regardless of the scale of that election (high-turnout vs. low-turnout and full jurisdiction coverage vs. partial coverage). The votes cast per VAP accounts for the fact that elections with more votes cast entail more work (more polling locations and voting equipment needing setup, more poll workers needed to recruit and train, more ballots to count and certify, etc.). In effect, this proxy for workload weights each election by its turnout relative to the jurisdiction's voting-age population.

To calculate how many elections local election officials administer each year in the United States, I sum each date that votes are cast in each election jurisdiction. However, this over-estimates the true number of elections administered. When people who relocate cast ballots in both their old and new jurisdictions in the same year, votes are recorded for each election date but only under the voter's most recent address. This creates false positive election dates. I use two methods to correct for movers. The first method (the "criteria" method) uses the most recent available voter file for each state for the previous year's elections, and then excludes election dates for each jurisdiction where either fewer than 100 votes were cast or the total number of votes cast was less than 1% of the highest total votes cast in an election date in that year, whichever is greater. The logic of this method is to identify election dates with very few votes cast relative to the highest turnout election that year and assume these are false positives from movers. If no election actually took place in the jurisdiction that year, then the threshold of 100 votes is adequate to eliminate the false appearance of elections in almost all cases. I exclude jurisdictions with populations under 1,000 residents from analysis using this method, as the 100-vote minimum threshold might eliminate legitimate low-turnout election dates in the least populated counties and municipalities. A second method (the "stayer" method) first filters the voter file to only cases where registered voters are continuously in the voter file between 2014 and 2021 and maintain the same residential address throughout that period. Then I use all voter files available for each state and count an election as occurring on a date in a jurisdiction if at least 1 vote is recorded as being cast. Both methods result in highly correlated election workloads (r = .87), with the second method generally resulting in higher average number of election dates. I report results from the criteria method in the main descriptive analysis as it reflects a more conservative estimate of the total number of elections administered in each jurisdiction, privileging the

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elimination of false positives over the minimization of false negatives. Both methods are used in statistical tests to ensure the robustness of the results.[5]

I employ similar methods to calculate the total votes cast in each jurisdiction. The main votes cast measurement is identical to the criteria measure with the caveat that thresholds and criterias are not used to exclude jurisdictions or votes. I also replicate the stayer method, only counting votes from voters who have stayed in the same jurisdiction across all voters files.

There is significant variation across and within states in the degree of responsibility county election officials have for administering municipal elections. Of the 42 states with county-administered elections, county officials have substantial duties in running municipal elections in 29 of them, whereas in 13 states county officials do not play a significant role in running sub-county contests. Appendix A.1 shows a state-by-state list of the average degree of local election official authority in administering within-jurisdiction elections that take place on off-cycle dates. The main results presented do not distinguish between places with high and low municipal authority for two reasons. First, I was only able to municipal responsibility data at the state level. In most states, there is variation between jurisdictions in the degree of responsibility county officials have for administering municipal elections. Second, it is difficult to distinguish which elections fall into the category of local/municipal. L2 designates some elections as being "Local or Municipal" in the voter file, but it is not clear how well this captures the true nature of each election. I conduct robustness tests subsetting jurisdictions by municipal election authority.

In addition to using the voter file, I manually collect data on the number of elections administered each year between 2014 and 2024 from county websites for the 400 most populous counties. In total, I was able to collect at least 1 years worth of data for 346 jurisdictions and full panel data for 315 counties. The correlation between the manually collected workload

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[5]An additional source of bias is the omission of local and special election data from some state voter files. It is not possible to correct such missing data; therefore, all numbers reported should be considered a lower threshold of the actual total election workload.

data and the criteria and stayer methods from the voter file are .67 and .69, respectively. I conduct robustness tests using this data.

3.2   Data on Election Official Turnover

I use data on election official turnover from Ferrer and Thompson (2025). This data identifies the chief individual local election official who administered each even-year general election from 2000 through 2024, collected from administrative records. Table A.1 in the online appendix lists the election officials coded for each state as well as their selection method and level of jurisdiction.

3.3   Estimating the Effect of Election Official Workload on Turnover

I combine my county-year level panel dataset of yearly elections administered with panel data on election official turnover from Ferrer and Thompson (2025). I use two methods of data analysis. First, I conduct cross-sectional tests averaging workload and turnover across the years of my dataset. These tests examine whether the places where election officials administer more elections correlate with where election official turnover is higher. Second, I employ county and state-by-year fixed effects, estimating the effect of changes in yearly Election Day workload on the probability of turnover. This estimation strategy depends on within-county variation in the yearly number of elections administered, compared to changes in the election workload of other counties in the same state. Such variation will be driven by the incidence of special district, special, municipal, and runoff elections, some of which only involve the participation of particular jurisdictions within the same state. It will also be driven by the consolidation of off-cycle election dates and the moving of previously off-cycle contests to November general elections. I employ a wide range of different time lags to measure number of Election Days, with the primary measurement being the number of Election Days administered in the two years prior to the incidence of election official turnover (including the year of the election where turnover occurred).

4 How Many Elections Do Election Officials Administer Each Year?

The average jurisdiction sees its typical chief local election official administer 2.19 elections each year.[6] This includes 1.87 federal, state, primary, special, and runoff elections, and an additional 0.32 municipal elections. Figure 1 shows the significant variation across jurisdictions, with some jurisdictions averaging less than 1 Election Day a year and some averaging over 6 Election Days every single year. Figure 2 shows over-time changes in the number of Election Days each year from 2014 to 2020. These within-jurisdiction changes are leveraged in the two-way fixed effect estimators. Finally, Figure 3 shows the average elections administered each year by state, breaking out those that are labeled as local or municipal by L2. As at the jurisdiction level, there is wide variation across states in terms of number of Election Dates each year, with Oklahoma officials administering over four elections per year and Wyoming just one. Local and municipal election dates make up a significant amount of the workload in most states with above-average election date workloads, and especially in South Carolina, Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, and Georgia. Section A.3 in the online appendix includes additional descriptive analysis of the workload data.

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[6]The average using the stayer method is 2.54 elections per year. Figure A.2 in the online appendix shows a state-level comparison of the two methods.

Figure 1: **Map of Average Number of Elections Run Per Year by Local Election Officials, 2014–2020**. This figure displays the average number of yearly elections administered by each county's local election officials between 2014 and 2020, calculated using the criteria method with nationwide voter file data from L2 spanning 2014–2020.

Figure 2: **Map of Elections Run Each Year, 2014–2020**. This figure displays the number of Election Days in each jurisdiction in 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2020, calculated using the criteria method with nationwide voter file data from L2.

Figure 3: **Average Number of Elections Run Per Year by Local Election Officials, 2014–2020**. This figure displays the average number of elections administered each year by each state's local election officials, calculated using the criteria method with nationwide voter file data from L2 and spanning 2014–2020. The blue bars include all elections. The red bars exclude elections that are labelled as "Local_or_Municipal" by L2.


Average Elections Run Per Year by State, 2014-2020

5 Effect of Election Date Consolidation on Election Official Turnover

Does reducing the number of election days officials administer each year increase the retention of local election officials and reduce the incidence of turnover? I first run regressions that average across all years in the dataset. These examine the cross-sectional relationship between workload and turnover. I find no clear evidence that jurisdictions with higher average number of Election Days also have higher rates of chief election official turnover. I then run a series of difference-in-difference regressions testing whether a change in the number of Election Days in a year leads to a change in the likelihood that an election official leaves their position. I find no evidence suggesting that reductions in workload increase retention of election officials.

5.1 Cross-sectional Relationship between Election Workload and Turnover

Do jurisdictions that have heavier workloads tend to have higher election official turnover rates than jurisdictions with lighter workloads? Table 1 displays regression results of the relationship between more yearly Election Days and official turnover. All specifications include state fixed effects and standard errors clustered by state. This means that comparisons are made between jurisdictions in the same states. The denominator is the total number of different local election officials running even-year general elections between 2014 and 2020. The numerator is the total number of different Election Days in those same years. Columns 1 and 2 use the criteria method to calculate election workload, and columns 3 and 4 use the stayer method. Elections labeled as "Local or Municipal" by L2 are excluded from the calculation of election workload in columns 2 and 4. The point estimate in column 1 suggests that jurisdictions with an additional Election Day (1/15th the average) over the period of analysis had .005 more election officials over that same period on average. This effect is mi-

nuscule considering that the average jurisdiction had 1.56 different election officials between 2014 and 2020. Two point estimates are positive and two are negative. In no specification can a null of no effect of total elections administered on total number of election officials be confidently ruled out. Table 2 uses the total number of votes cast per voting-age population as a proxy for workload. Besides this change in variable of interest, the specifications are identical to those in Table 1. The results are nearly identical: two coefficients and positive, two are negative, and none can be confidently distinguished from a null effect. The point estimate in column suggests that an additional full-turnout election increases the total number of local election officials over those 4 even-year election periods by .007—again a tiny effect compared to a mean of 1.56.

Table 1: Relationship Between Election Workload and Turnover, 2014–2020

	Total Number of LEOs			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Total Elections Administered	0.005	0.012	−0.0002	−0.0001
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.003)
State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Method	Criteria	Criteria	Stayer	Stayer
Includes Local Elections	Yes	No	Yes	No
Observations	4,990	4,990	6,259	6,259

Table 2: Relationship Between Election Workload and Turnover, 2014–2020

	Total Number of LEOs			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Total Votes Per VAP	0.007	0.011	−0.005	−0.004
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.008)
State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Method	Criteria	Criteria	Stayer	Stayer
Includes Local Elections	Yes	No	Yes	No
Observations	6,252	6,252	6,200	6,200

Tables A.3 and A.4 in the online appendix test the robustness of these results to the dropping of state fixed effects. This means that comparisons are made between jurisdictions across the entire country, not just within the same state. The point estimates are similarly scattered around zero and suggest there is no clear relationship between more Election Days and higher election official turnover rates.

5.2 Difference-in-Difference tests of the Effect of Election Work-load on Turnover

This section examines the causal effect of variations in number of Election Days in preceding years on the likelihood of turnover in the chief local election official position. Table 3 shows the effect of changes in the number of elections administered over the past two years on the two-year turnover rate. The "past two years" are defined as including the the even-year general election which measures a change in turnover. All specifications include jurisdiction and Year x State fixed effects, meaning comparisons only made between jurisdictions within the same state. Columns 1 and 2 use the criteria method to measure workload, whereas columns 3 and 4 use the stayer method. Odd columns include L2-defined "local and munic-ipal" elections, and even columns exclude them. The point estimate in column 1 suggests that an additional Election Day over the past 2 Years (one-quarter of the mean number of Election Days over a 2-year period) decreases the likelihood that there is a new election official by .8 percentage points. This is small in comparison to the average 2-year turnover rate of 19%. All four point estimates are negative, indicating that higher election workloads lead to increased election official retention. None can be confidently distinguished from a null effect.

Table 4 presents similar specifications, but instead measures workload as the average number of votes cast per voting-age population. Again, the point estimates indicate that, if anything, that higher workloads increase retention, although these likely mean the true effect is near-zero. The point estimate in column 1 suggests that one additional full-turnout

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Table 3: Effect of Election Workload on Turnover, 2014–2020

| | 2-Year Turnover | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elections Administered over Past 2 Years	−0.008	−0.004	−0.009	−0.005
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Jurisdiction FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Method	Criteria	Criteria	Stayer	Stayer
Includes Local Elections	Yes	No	Yes	No
Observations	14,970	14,970	18,777	18,777

election over a 2-year period (a 2-standard deviation increase) reduces the likelihood of turnover by 1.2 percentage points.

Table 4: Effect of Election Workload on Turnover, 2014–2020 (Measured by Votes Cast)

| | 2-Year Turnover | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Votes Per VAP over Past 2 Years	−0.012	−0.005	0.013	0.009
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.037)	(0.039)
Jurisdiction FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Method	Criteria	Criteria	Stayer	Stayer
Includes Local Elections	Yes	No	Yes	No
Observations	18,756	18,756	18,600	18,600

These null results are robust a wide range of alternative specifications, including varying the definitions of turnover and workload, subsetting to the places that we'd be most likely to expect an effect, and using alternative methods to collect workload data, which are displayed in the online appendix. Table A.5 measures turnover over a four-year period rather than a two-year period. The point estimates are all close to 0 and are not statistically distinguishable from a null result. Table A.6 changes the measurement of workload to be the two prior years of Election Dates, not counting the year in which turnover is measured. Table A.7 instead measures workload as the two years of Election Dates prior to the two-year period in

which turnover is measured (effectively the third and fourth lagged years). In both tables, all point estimates are again statistically indistinguishable from zero. Table A.8 subsets to jurisdictions in states with a high degree of responsibility for administering local/municipal elections, and Table A.9 subsets the data to county-administered election jurisdictions, cutting out all municipal-administered jurisdictions. All eight point estimates in these subset analyses are negative and two attain conventional levels of statistical significance, implausibly suggesting that higher election workloads lead to lower levels of turnover, but the effect sizes are substantively small. The largest point estimate, column 4 of Table A.9, suggests that an additional election administered over the past two years reduces the likelihood that a jurisdiction experiences turnover over a 2-year period by 1.4 percentage points.

Tables A.10 and A.11 employ year fixed effects instead of year-by-state fixed effects, allowing comparisons between jurisdictions in different states. All point estimates are positive in these specifications, and they attain conventional levels of statistical significance in three specifications. The largest effect size, found in column 2 of Table A.11, means that 1 additional election date over a 2-year period translates to a 1.4 percentage point increase in the likelihood of turnover. This is statistically quite small (effect size = .036), but substantively translates into a 7.4% increase in the likelihood of turnover. Finally, Table A.12 tests the effects of workload collected through examining websites of the 400 most populous counties for data on the number of Election Dates each year. Three of the point estimates are negative—and two of them attain conventional levels of statistical significance.

In sum, across regressions varying the method of workload calculation, the number of years used to calculate workload, the definition of turnover as two or four years, the inclusion of exclusion of local elections, and lags employed, I find evidence consistent with there being minimal effects of number of Election Days administered on retention of local election officials. There is roughly an equal number of tests that result in positive and negative point estimates. Most are statistically indistinguishable from zero, and among the few that reach conventional levels of statistical significance, there are as many with a negative effect as a

positive one. The largest positive relationship between workload and turnover—an additional election date over a two-year period leading to a 7.4% increase in the likelihood of turnover—while in isolation might be suggestive of an effect, could easily arise by chance given the large number of tests performed. Additionally, the most positive effects were identified in the less causally credible specifications. Therefore, I conclude that there is little evidence that the number of Election Days or the number of votes cast (relative to the voting-age population) affect the likelihood that a chief election official will stay in their role.

6   Conclusion

While it may seem like commonsense that heavier workloads will result in burnout and shorter tenures for public officials, most studies of the relationship have relied on surveys that are rife with the potential for misreporting and intentions that do not translate into reality. Using a novel strategy to translate administrative data on voting records into the record of Election Dates and a massive collection of administrative data on chief local election officials, I find little evidence that higher workloads, proxied by more Election Dates and more votes cast, lead to earlier departures of those running America's elections. Across a wide range of robustness tests, I consistently find that workloads appear to have little effect on the likelihood that an election official will stay in their job for the next major election.

This paper has important implications for the field of election administration. Turnover rates have increased precipitously over the past two decades (Ferrer, Thompson, and Orey 2024). While it appears this has not resulted in worse quality of election administration (Ferrer and Thompson 2025), there are legitimate concerns that increased turnover portends increasing difficulty in finding and keeping quality election administrators. Job satisfaction among local election officials has dropped 14 percentage points since the 2020 election, with increasing workloads cited as one of the main drivers of this decline.[7] While reducing the

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[7]https://evic.reed.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/2024-EVIC-LEO-Survey-Result-Report-Final-Source-File-v13.pdf

number of separate elections may cut costs and make the voting process more convenient for the public, in addition to other benefits, it does not appear to have a clear effect on increasing retention of local election officials. Reformers interested in increasing election official retention should look to other promising strategies, such as increasing salaries, professionalization opportunities, and public awareness of the work these public servants undertake—at least when it comes to those leading election offices.

It is important to note that election officials are not the only government employees reporting increasing workload concerns. While this study tests the relationship between workload and turnover for one public office, it could still be the case that increasing workloads in government contribute to higher turnover rates for other offices. More work is needed to understand the potential dangers of increasing public workloads, especially in an era of government retrenchment and mass layoffs. The ability of America's government to serve its residents depends on the presence of qualified public servants willing to work for low pay and long hours to serve the common good. It is imperative we better understand the limits of this ask.

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Online Appendix

Intended for online publication only.

Contents

A.1 Collection and Coding of Local Election Officials

Table A.1 lists the election officials used in each state, as well as their geography, selection method, and typical degree of responsibility for administering municipal elections. Whether there is variation in this responsibility within each state is also noted.

Table A.1: **Local Election Official Responsibility for Off-Cycle Municipal Elections by State**

State	Jurisdictions	Geography	Election Official	Selection Method	Muni Responsibility	Variation
Alabama	67	County	Probate Judge	Elected	Med	No
Alaska	5	Region	Regional Election Supervisor	Appointed	Low	No
Arizona	15	County	County Election Administrator / County Recorder	Mixed	Med	Yes
Arkansas	75	County	Clerk	Elected	Med	Yes
California	58	County	Clerk / Registrar of Voters / Auditor / Director of Elections	Mixed	Med	Yes
Colorado	64	County	Clerk and Recorder	Mixed	Low	Yes
Connecticut	178	Municipal	Clerk	Mixed	High	No
Delaware	3	County	Director of Elections	Appointed	Low	No
Florida	67	County	Supervisor of Elections	Mixed	High	No
Georgia	159	County	Elections Director / Probate Judge	Mixed	Low	No
Hawaii	5	County	Clerk	Appointed	Low	No
Idaho	44	County	Clerk	Elected	High	No
Illinois	102	County	Clerk / Executive Director	Mixed	High	Yes
Indiana	92	County	Clerk	Elected	High	Yes
Iowa	99	County	Auditor	Elected	High	No
Kansas	105	County	Clerk	Mixed	High	No
Kentucky	120	County	Clerk	Elected	High	No
Louisiana	64	Parish	Clerk of Court	Elected	High	No
Maine	504	Municipal	Clerk	Mixed	Low	No
Maryland	24	County	Election Director	Appointed	High	No
Massachusetts	351	Municipal	Clerk / Elections Commissioner	Mixed	Low	No
Michigan	83	County	Clerk	Elected	Low	Yes
Minnesota	87	County	Auditor / Election Director	Mixed	Low	No
Mississippi	82	County	Circuit Clerk	Elected	High	No
Missouri	115	County	Clerk / Director of Elections	Elected	High	No
Montana	56	County	Clerk and Recorder / Election Administrator	Mixed	High	Yes
Nebraska	93	County	Clerk / Election Commissioner	Mixed	Med	No
Nevada	17	County	Clerk / Registrar of Voters	Mixed	High	No
New Hampshire	234	Municipal	Clerk	Mixed	High	No
New Jersey	21	County	Clerk	Elected	High	Yes
New Mexico	33	County	Clerk	Elected	Low	Yes
New York	62	County	Election Commissioner	Appointed	High	No
North Carolina	100	County	Election Director	Appointed	Low	Yes
North Dakota	53	County	Auditor	Elected	High	No
Ohio	88	County	County Election Director	Appointed	Low	Yes
Oklahoma	77	County	Election Board Secretary	Appointed	High	No
Oregon	36	County	Clerk / Elections Director	Mixed	Low	Yes
Pennsylvania	67	County	Director of Elections	Appointed	High	No
Rhode Island	39	Municipal	Clerk / Registrar / Election Director	Mixed	High	No
South Carolina	46	County	Director of Voter Registration and Elections	Appointed	High	No
South Dakota	66	County	Auditor	Mixed	High	Yes
Tennessee	95	County	Administrator of Elections	Appointed	Med	Yes
Texas	254	County	Elections Administrator / Clerk / Tax Assessor	Mixed	High	No
Utah	29	County	Clerk	Elected	Low	Yes
Vermont	246	Municipal	Clerk	Mixed	Low	Yes
Virginia	133	County	General Registrar	Appointed	High	No
Washington	39	County	Auditor / Elections Director	Elected	High	No
West Virginia	55	County	Clerk / Elections Coordinator	Mixed	High	No
Wisconsin	1851	Municipal	Clerk	Mixed	Med	Yes
Wyoming	23	County	Clerk	Elected	High	No

Number of jurisdictions are total number of jurisdictions in that state. In states where multiple officials are coded, a '/' separates each distinct official and they are listed in order by frequency. In the turnover dataset, the official in each jurisdiction with primary authority to administer elections is coded, especially those who oversee voting administration on Election Day. Selection method indicates whether all officials coded in each state are elected, appointed, or a mix of both. Sole authority designates whether the official is the only election authority in that jurisdiction, excepting local legislative bodies that determine election administration budgets and appointing bodies whose sole purpose is to select a chief election official. Muni Responsibility indicates the degree of responsibility the local election official has in administering off-cycle municipal elections. Variation indicates whether jurisdictions within the state vary according to their degree of responsibility in administering off-cycle municipal elections. In states with variation, the modal degree of responsibility is used.

A.2 L2 Voter File Dates Used

Table A.2 lists the dates of each L2 state voter file used, as per best practices (Kim and Fraga 2022).

Table A.2: L2 Voter File Dates Used

State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date
AK	4/18/2014	AK	3/13/2015	AK	7/28/2015	AK	8/26/2015
AK	12/9/2015	AK	2/9/2016	AK	5/21/2016	AK	6/22/2016
AK	9/23/2016	AK	1/27/2017	AK	5/25/2017	AK	8/15/2018
AK	10/2/2018	AK	5/3/2019	AK	7/2/2019	AK	2/24/2020
AK	8/14/2020	AK	10/9/2020	AK	2/3/2021	AK	7/4/2021
AK	11/3/2021	AK	11/24/2021	AL	3/18/2014	AL	4/10/2015
AL	7/29/2015	AL	10/14/2015	AL	12/9/2015	AL	1/24/2016
AL	3/7/2017	AL	6/13/2017	AL	11/1/2017	AL	7/7/2018
AL	5/16/2019	AL	6/12/2019	AL	8/27/2019	AL	2/17/2020
AL	2/24/2020	AL	4/10/2020	AL	8/14/2020	AL	10/9/2020
AL	2/24/2021	AL	7/5/2021	AL	11/3/2021	AL	11/14/2021
AR	4/11/2014	AR	3/24/2015	AR	7/28/2015	AR	8/31/2015
AR	3/15/2016	AR	9/23/2016	AR	3/29/2017	AR	7/5/2017
AR	1/30/2018	AR	9/20/2018	AR	5/13/2019	AR	9/21/2019
AR	2/7/2020	AR	2/24/2020	AR	4/11/2020	AR	7/30/2020
AR	3/16/2021	AR	11/3/2021	AZ	3/14/2014	AZ	4/22/2015
AZ	7/28/2015	AZ	10/3/2016	AZ	4/12/2017	AZ	8/26/2017
AZ	10/24/2017	AZ	8/27/2018	AZ	5/10/2019	AZ	10/21/2019
AZ	2/19/2020	AZ	6/16/2020	AZ	10/23/2020	AZ	1/13/2021
AZ	5/20/2021	AZ	7/5/2021	AZ	11/3/2021	CA	3/21/2014
CA	5/21/2015	CA	9/29/2016	CA	7/8/2017	CA	8/17/2018
CA	8/2/2019	CA	7/2/2020	CA	8/24/2021	CO	5/5/2014
CO	5/5/2015	CO	7/28/2015	CO	1/30/2016	CO	10/13/2016
CO	12/15/2016	CO	2/8/2017	CO	6/1/2017	CO	12/27/2017
CO	8/8/2018	CO	12/20/2018	CO	5/8/2019	CO	8/31/2019
CO	1/23/2020	CO	2/26/2020	CO	4/23/2020	CO	6/24/2020
CO	8/24/2020	CO	10/30/2020	CO	12/23/2020	CO	5/28/2021
CO	7/5/2021	CO	11/3/2021	CT	3/14/2014	CT	3/25/2015
CT	7/28/2015	CT	8/17/2015	CT	3/9/2016	CT	9/23/2016
CT	1/20/2017	CT	6/9/2017	CT	8/27/2018	CT	5/8/2019
CT	6/3/2019	CT	2/21/2020	CT	8/14/2020	CT	10/13/2020
State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date

State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date
CT	3/30/2021	CT	7/13/2021	DC	3/14/2014	DC	3/7/2015
DC	7/28/2015	DC	3/1/2016	DC	9/23/2016	DC	2/15/2017
DC	6/19/2017	DC	3/1/2018	DC	5/3/2019	DC	6/5/2019
DC	1/13/2020	DC	3/2/2020	DC	4/30/2020	DC	7/30/2020
DC	1/30/2021	DC	7/5/2021	DE	3/20/2014	DE	2/23/2015
DE	8/18/2015	DE	9/23/2016	DE	1/17/2017	DE	1/11/2018
DE	8/18/2018	DE	10/12/2018	DE	5/10/2019	DE	10/3/2019
DE	2/16/2020	DE	8/14/2020	DE	10/23/2020	DE	3/24/2021
DE	7/5/2021	DE	11/3/2021	FL	3/17/2014	FL	1/28/2015
FL	5/16/2015	FL	3/1/2016	FL	3/6/2017	FL	8/2/2018
FL	7/4/2019	FL	7/30/2020	FL	7/20/2021	GA	4/20/2014
GA	9/1/2015	GA	9/23/2016	GA	8/16/2017	GA	7/5/2018
GA	6/11/2019	GA	7/24/2020	GA	7/16/2021	HI	5/1/2014
HI	9/23/2016	HI	3/22/2017	HI	8/27/2018	HI	10/24/2019
HI	10/22/2020	HI	7/5/2021	IA	5/2/2014	IA	1/27/2015
IA	3/25/2015	IA	7/28/2015	IA	9/5/2015	IA	10/18/2016
IA	1/31/2017	IA	6/13/2017	IA	8/25/2018	IA	8/27/2018
IA	5/10/2019	IA	11/26/2019	IA	1/9/2020	IA	3/3/2020
IA	4/23/2020	IA	8/6/2020	IA	10/22/2020	IA	3/4/2021
IA	7/7/2021	IA	11/3/2021	ID	3/20/2014	ID	2/23/2015
ID	7/29/2015	ID	3/2/2016	ID	10/5/2016	ID	3/20/2017
ID	7/25/2017	ID	8/25/2017	ID	8/21/2018	ID	8/27/2018
ID	5/3/2019	ID	7/10/2019	ID	2/24/2020	ID	8/14/2020
ID	10/4/2020	ID	3/16/2021	ID	7/5/2021	ID	11/3/2021
ID	11/17/2021	IL	3/16/2014	IL	3/2/2015	IL	9/23/2016
IL	9/27/2017	IL	8/27/2018	IL	5/14/2019	IL	3/3/2020
IL	7/16/2021	IN	3/27/2014	IN	5/6/2015	IN	7/29/2015
IN	8/7/2015	IN	2/7/2016	IN	9/23/2016	IN	4/7/2017
IN	7/12/2017	IN	10/12/2017	IN	3/16/2018	IN	10/17/2018
IN	5/3/2019	IN	8/1/2019	IN	1/22/2020	IN	2/27/2020
IN	5/7/2020	IN	8/24/2020	IN	1/15/2021	IN	7/8/2021
KS	3/16/2014	KS	2/26/2015	KS	7/29/2015	KS	12/11/2015
KS	9/23/2016	KS	2/16/2017	KS	6/19/2017	KS	7/9/2018
KS	5/3/2019	KS	6/11/2019	KS	2/24/2020	KS	3/18/2020
KS	7/15/2020	KS	3/16/2021	KS	8/24/2021	KY	3/19/2014
KY	3/5/2015	KY	7/29/2015	KY	12/12/2015	KY	2/21/2016
KY	9/23/2016	KY	3/3/2017	KY	6/23/2017	KY	5/2/2018
KY	9/29/2018	KY	5/10/2019	KY	11/18/2019	KY	2/26/2020
KY	8/14/2020	KY	9/14/2020	KY	5/11/2021	KY	11/3/2021
State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date State	Election Date	

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State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date
KY	12/8/2021	LA	3/20/2014	LA	2/23/2015	LA	5/17/2015
LA	7/29/2015	LA	12/12/2015	LA	1/29/2016	LA	9/23/2016
LA	2/14/2017	LA	7/17/2017	LA	10/31/2017	LA	6/25/2018
LA	5/15/2019	LA	9/24/2019	LA	12/11/2019	LA	2/27/2020
LA	8/14/2020	LA	10/18/2020	LA	1/22/2021	LA	7/7/2021
LA	11/3/2021	MA	3/16/2014	MA	4/2/2015	MA	12/12/2015
MA	2/26/2016	MA	9/28/2016	MA	4/11/2017	MA	10/17/2017
MA	5/11/2018	MA	1/18/2019	MA	5/10/2019	MA	8/15/2019
MA	2/19/2020	MA	5/29/2020	MA	9/28/2020	MA	1/19/2021
MA	7/8/2021	MA	12/19/2021	MD	3/26/2014	MD	2/25/2015
MD	7/29/2015	MD	12/12/2015	MD	10/3/2016	MD	1/20/2017
MD	6/9/2017	MD	9/7/2017	MD	2/22/2018	MD	5/10/2019
MD	6/20/2019	MD	12/17/2019	MD	2/28/2020	MD	5/7/2020
MD	8/21/2020	MD	2/15/2021	MD	7/5/2021	MD	11/3/2021
MD	12/17/2021	ME	3/20/2014	ME	4/29/2015	ME	7/29/2015
ME	12/12/2015	ME	10/5/2016	ME	4/7/2017	ME	11/1/2017
ME	4/28/2018	ME	5/3/2019	ME	7/17/2019	ME	2/24/2020
ME	6/18/2020	ME	9/29/2020	ME	5/28/2021	ME	7/5/2021
ME	11/3/2021	MI	3/17/2014	MI	2/28/2015	MI	12/11/2015
MI	9/28/2016	MI	2/21/2017	MI	7/17/2018	MI	10/1/2018
MI	5/13/2019	MI	8/30/2019	MI	3/2/2020	MI	8/14/2020
MI	9/20/2020	MI	11/3/2021	MI	1/5/2022	MN	3/17/2014
MN	3/3/2015	MN	7/31/2015	MN	12/12/2015	MN	2/25/2016
MN	10/3/2016	MN	3/10/2017	MN	7/22/2017	MN	7/31/2018
MN	8/27/2018	MN	5/10/2019	MN	10/3/2019	MN	2/25/2020
MN	8/14/2020	MN	10/19/2020	MN	2/14/2021	MN	7/23/2021
MO	3/19/2014	MO	3/2/2015	MO	7/30/2015	MO	9/3/2015
MO	9/28/2016	MO	12/1/2016	MO	2/8/2017	MO	6/7/2017
MO	6/28/2018	MO	10/5/2018	MO	5/10/2019	MO	6/3/2019
MO	2/20/2020	MO	6/23/2020	MO	9/22/2020	MO	2/11/2021
MS	3/17/2014	MS	3/17/2015	MS	7/29/2015	MS	12/13/2015
MS	2/19/2016	MS	10/3/2016	MS	7/27/2017	MS	3/23/2018
MS	9/18/2018	MS	3/11/2019	MS	5/12/2019	MS	8/8/2019
MS	3/3/2020	MS	6/9/2020	MS	8/17/2020	MS	3/23/2021
MS	11/3/2021	MT	3/18/2014	MT	3/27/2015	MT	7/30/2015
MT	12/13/2015	MT	10/3/2016	MT	1/25/2017	MT	7/14/2017
MT	8/3/2018	MT	5/3/2019	MT	6/13/2019	MT	2/29/2020
MT	3/14/2020	MT	8/19/2020	MT	12/14/2020	MT	11/3/2021
MT	11/22/2021	NC	3/27/2014	NC	7/29/2015	NC	10/19/2016
State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date

State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date
NC	5/24/2017	NC	6/28/2018	NC	5/10/2019	NC	8/14/2020
NC	5/18/2021	ND	3/17/2014	ND	4/15/2015	ND	7/31/2015
ND	12/13/2015	ND	9/28/2016	ND	2/9/2017	ND	3/21/2018
ND	9/8/2018	ND	5/13/2019	ND	10/14/2019	ND	2/28/2020
ND	8/15/2020	ND	9/18/2020	ND	3/18/2021	ND	7/5/2021
ND	11/3/2021	NE	3/18/2014	NE	3/25/2015	NE	7/29/2015
NE	12/13/2015	NE	10/3/2016	NE	1/13/2017	NE	5/25/2017
NE	7/11/2018	NE	5/3/2019	NE	11/26/2019	NE	2/20/2020
NE	3/18/2020	NE	6/27/2020	NE	1/20/2021	NE	7/30/2021
NE	11/3/2021	NH	3/17/2014	NH	10/13/2014	NH	3/20/2015
NH	7/29/2015	NH	9/11/2015	NH	12/13/2015	NH	10/3/2016
NH	8/15/2018	NH	8/27/2018	NH	5/13/2019	NH	10/22/2019
NH	1/5/2020	NH	3/3/2020	NH	7/30/2020	NH	3/25/2021
NH	7/5/2021	NJ	4/22/2014	NJ	2/25/2015	NJ	7/30/2015
NJ	12/12/2015	NJ	9/29/2016	NJ	3/31/2017	NJ	4/25/2017
NJ	9/20/2017	NJ	3/6/2018	NJ	10/16/2018	NJ	3/1/2019
NJ	5/13/2019	NJ	9/30/2019	NJ	2/26/2020	NJ	5/12/2020
NJ	6/18/2020	NJ	9/9/2020	NJ	3/11/2021	NJ	7/11/2021
NJ	8/26/2021	NJ	11/3/2021	NJ	1/5/2022	NM	3/20/2014
NM	3/19/2015	NM	7/29/2015	NM	12/13/2015	NM	3/12/2016
NM	9/28/2016	NM	2/8/2017	NM	8/12/2017	NM	10/26/2017
NM	8/21/2018	NM	11/7/2018	NM	5/3/2019	NM	6/17/2019
NM	6/24/2019	NM	11/9/2019	NM	2/24/2020	NM	4/15/2020
NM	8/24/2020	NM	2/25/2021	NM	7/9/2021	NM	11/3/2021
NM	1/4/2022	NV	3/14/2014	NV	1/30/2015	NV	5/28/2015
NV	7/29/2015	NV	12/13/2015	NV	10/7/2016	NV	1/13/2017
NV	5/24/2017	NV	11/24/2017	NV	8/10/2018	NV	5/3/2019
NV	6/4/2019	NV	1/11/2020	NV	2/22/2020	NV	4/22/2020
NV	8/5/2020	NV	12/17/2020	NV	6/13/2021	NV	7/7/2021
NV	11/3/2021	NY	4/15/2014	NY	7/28/2015	NY	10/23/2016
NY	6/17/2017	NY	8/14/2018	NY	7/25/2019	NY	8/24/2020
NY	11/3/2021	OH	3/17/2014	OH	7/29/2015	OH	10/5/2016
OH	6/30/2017	OH	6/28/2018	OH	5/22/2019	OH	5/3/2020
OH	5/28/2021	OK	3/17/2014	OK	3/26/2015	OK	7/29/2015
OK	12/13/2015	OK	2/24/2016	OK	10/3/2016	OK	1/12/2017
OK	4/22/2017	OK	6/8/2017	OK	8/6/2018	OK	10/9/2018
OK	5/3/2019	OK	8/13/2019	OK	1/10/2020	OK	2/25/2020
OK	4/15/2020	OK	6/1/2020	OK	7/29/2020	OK	9/19/2020
OK	2/8/2021	OK	11/3/2021	OK	12/8/2021	OR	3/17/2014
State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date

State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date
OR	4/16/2015	OR	7/29/2015	OR	12/13/2015	OR	10/26/2016
OR	1/13/2017	OR	6/6/2017	OR	9/13/2017	OR	7/26/2018
OR	8/27/2018	OR	5/8/2019	OR	6/25/2019	OR	1/7/2020
OR	2/25/2020	OR	7/17/2020	OR	2/5/2021	OR	7/9/2021
OR	11/3/2021	PA	5/1/2014	PA	7/29/2015	PA	3/8/2016
PA	8/4/2017	PA	8/24/2018	PA	8/22/2019	PA	7/2/2020
PA	7/16/2021	RI	3/19/2014	RI	3/6/2015	RI	7/29/2015
RI	12/13/2015	RI	10/3/2016	RI	1/18/2017	RI	6/8/2017
RI	7/17/2018	RI	8/27/2018	RI	5/10/2019	RI	8/16/2019
RI	12/4/2019	RI	2/28/2020	RI	8/15/2020	RI	10/1/2020
RI	3/16/2021	RI	7/7/2021	SC	10/22/2014	SC	4/9/2015
SC	10/31/2015	SC	2/11/2016	SC	10/3/2016	SC	2/24/2017
SC	8/31/2017	SC	4/4/2018	SC	9/11/2018	SC	9/5/2019
SC	12/18/2019	SC	2/21/2020	SC	6/4/2020	SC	9/16/2020
SC	5/21/2021	SC	11/3/2021	SD	3/20/2014	SD	7/29/2015
SD	10/6/2015	SD	12/13/2015	SD	2/15/2016	SD	9/28/2016
SD	2/20/2017	SD	6/16/2017	SD	6/8/2018	SD	5/11/2019
SD	5/23/2019	SD	11/26/2019	SD	2/18/2020	SD	2/25/2020
SD	8/19/2020	SD	1/22/2021	SD	7/6/2021	TN	3/18/2014
TN	2/23/2015	TN	7/30/2015	TN	9/11/2015	TN	10/2/2016
TN	2/17/2017	TN	7/6/2017	TN	7/19/2018	TN	5/10/2019
TN	7/5/2019	TN	2/20/2020	TN	3/31/2020	TN	5/20/2020
TN	10/18/2020	TN	3/29/2021	TN	7/19/2021	TX	3/19/2014
TX	7/31/2015	TX	9/30/2016	TX	8/21/2017	TX	6/29/2018
TX	5/24/2019	TX	5/24/2020	TX	6/12/2021	UT	3/20/2014
UT	3/6/2015	UT	7/29/2015	UT	8/7/2015	UT	12/13/2015
UT	10/3/2016	UT	1/25/2017	UT	6/2/2017	UT	8/22/2018
UT	8/27/2018	UT	5/3/2019	UT	8/3/2019	UT	2/27/2020
UT	4/7/2020	UT	8/11/2020	UT	9/30/2020	UT	3/26/2021
UT	7/8/2021	UT	11/3/2021	VA	3/14/2014	VA	4/18/2015
VA	7/31/2015	VA	9/30/2015	VA	12/14/2015	VA	9/28/2016
VA	3/29/2017	VA	10/7/2017	VA	8/27/2018	VA	8/30/2018
VA	2/25/2019	VA	5/11/2019	VA	6/17/2019	VA	9/16/2019
VA	3/1/2020	VA	8/15/2020	VA	9/9/2020	VA	5/28/2021
VA	7/10/2021	VA	11/3/2021	VA	1/4/2022	VT	3/19/2014
VT	3/20/2015	VT	7/31/2015	VT	12/13/2015	VT	2/11/2016
VT	9/21/2016	VT	2/14/2017	VT	5/31/2017	VT	6/12/2017
VT	6/11/2018	VT	8/27/2018	VT	5/12/2019	VT	8/22/2019
VT	2/12/2020	VT	2/27/2020	VT	8/3/2020	VT	9/11/2020
State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date

| State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date
VT	5/28/2021	VT	7/4/2021	VT	11/3/2021	WA	3/19/2014
WA	5/5/2015	WA	7/29/2015	WA	9/10/2015	WA	12/14/2015
WA	10/28/2016	WA	12/23/2016	WA	5/24/2017	WA	9/16/2017
WA	12/19/2017	WA	7/15/2018	WA	5/12/2019	WA	5/22/2019
WA	10/15/2019	WA	12/20/2019	WA	3/3/2020	WA	4/20/2020
WA	7/22/2021	WI	3/18/2014	WI	3/3/2015	WI	7/31/2015
WI	9/8/2015	WI	10/3/2016	WI	3/30/2017	WI	6/2/2018
WI	5/10/2019	WI	6/23/2019	WI	3/3/2020	WI	3/21/2020
WI	5/31/2020	WI	9/29/2020	WI	2/24/2021	WI	11/3/2021
WV	4/16/2014	WV	3/16/2015	WV	7/29/2015	WV	9/10/2015
WV	12/14/2015	WV	9/28/2016	WV	4/3/2017	WV	9/20/2017
WV	8/14/2018	WV	11/6/2018	WV	5/12/2019	WV	9/5/2019
WV	2/27/2020	WV	3/29/2020	WV	8/15/2020	WV	10/6/2020
WV	3/11/2021	WV	7/9/2021	WY	3/19/2014	WY	3/30/2015
WY	7/29/2015	WY	8/6/2015	WY	12/13/2015	WY	9/28/2016
WY	2/2/2017	WY	7/17/2017	WY	7/26/2018	WY	8/27/2018
WY	5/12/2019	WY	9/6/2019	WY	3/2/2020	WY	8/14/2020
WY	10/9/2020	WY	1/13/2021	WY	7/6/2021		
State	Election Date	State	Election Date	State	Election Date State	Election Date	

A.3 Additional Election Workload Descriptive Figures

This section includes a range of additional county- and state-level visualizations of Election workload, as well as comparisons across calculation methods.

A.3.1 State-Year Workload Averages

Figure A.1 shows election date workloads at the state-year level. While states tend to have more election dates in even years, the difference is surprisingly not large in most states. Additionally, there is no clear overall trend of increasing or decreasing workloads.

Figure A.1: **Average Number of Elections Run Per Year by Local Election Officials, Over Time Comparison**. This figure displays the average number of elections administered each year by each state's local election officials, calculated using the criteria method with nationwide voter file data from L2 and spanning 2014–2020.

Average Number of Elections Administered by Local Election Officials

A.3.2 Comparison of Election Workload Methods

Figure A.2 shows the average number of elections administered in each state, comparing the criteria and stayer methods of calculation. The criteria method is almost always the more conservative measure of election workload.

Figure A.2: **Average Number of Elections Run Per Year by Local Election Officials, 2014–2020 (Comparing Methods)**. This figure displays the average number of elections administered each year by each state's local election officials between 2014 and 2020. The blue bars use the stayers method to calculate election date workload. The red bars use the criteria method for calculating workload.

A.3.3 State-Level Workload Maps

Figure A.3 is a map of the average number of yearly election dates in each jurisdiction, averaged to the state level and using the criteria method to calculate workload. Figure A.4 shows snapshots of the state-level workload averages in even years between 2014 and 2020.

Figure A.3: **Map of Average Number of Election Dates in Each State, 2014–2020**. This map displays the average number of elections administered each year by each state's local election officials between 2014 and 2020 using the criteria method to calculate workload.

Figure A.4: **Map of Average Number of Elections Run in Each State, 2014–2020**. This map displays the average number of elections administered each year by each state's local election officials between 2014 and 2020, averaged to the state level and using the criteria method to calculate workload.

A.3.4 Alternative County-Level Workload Maps

Figure A.5 shows the average number of elections administered in each county election jurisdiction, calculated using the stayer method instead of the criteria method. The patterns of high and low workloads are broadly similar to those found in the Figure 1 using the criteria method. In general, the stayer method produces higher average estimates of Election Date workloads. Figure A.6 shows the average number of elections administered in each county election jurisdiction, calculated using the criteria method but excluding elections labeled by L2 as local or municipal elections. Figure A.7 shows overtime jurisdiction-level changes in the number of election dates administered each year similar to Figure 2 in the main analysis, instead using the stayer method of workload calculation.

Figure A.5: **Map of Average Number of Elections Run Per Year by Local Election Officials using Stayer Method, 2014–2020**. This figure displays the average number of yearly elections administered by each county's local election officials between 2014 and 2020, calculated using the stayer method with nationwide voter file data from L2 spanning 2014–2020.

Figure A.6: **Map of Average Number of Elections Run Per Year by Local Election Officials Excluding Local Elections, 2014–2020**. This figure displays the average number of yearly elections administered by each county's local election officials between 2014 and 2020, calculated using the criteria method with nationwide voter file data from L2 spanning 2014–2020. Elections that L2 labels as "Local or Municipal" are excluded from this analysis.

Figure A.7: **Map of Elections Run Each Year using Stayer Method, 2014–2020**. This figure displays the number of Election Days in each jurisdiction in 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2020, calculated using the stayer method with nationwide voter file data from L2.

A.4 Additional Cross-Sectional Tests of the Relationship Between Workload and Turnover

Tables 1 and 2 in the main paper should the results of the cross-sectional relationship between elections administered and incidents of turnover when state fixed effects are included. This means comparisons were made leveraging variation in workload and turnover across jurisdictions within the same state. Tables A.3 and A.4 are identical to the tables in the main table, but no longer include state fixed effects. This means that comparisons are made between jurisdictions across the entire country. The results are similar: some point estimates are positive, some are negative, and none indicate an effect that is statistically distinguishable from zero.

Table A.3: Relationship Between Election Workload and Turnover, 2014–2020

	Total Number of LEOs			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Total Elections Administered	−0.002	0.008	−0.005	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	1.593	1.450	1.644	1.537
	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.059)	(0.072)
State FEs	No	No	No	No
Method	Criteria	Criteria	Stayer	Stayer
Includes Local Elections	Yes	No	Yes	No
Observations	4,990	4,990	6,259	6,259

Table A.4: Relationship Between Election Workload and Turnover, 2014–2020

| | Total Number of LEOs | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Total Votes Per VAP	−0.001	0.010	0.003	0.013
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Constant	1.567	1.520	1.554	1.532
	(0.079)	(0.074)	(0.039)	(0.042)
State FEs	No	No	No	No
Method	Criteria	Criteria	Stayer	Stayer
Includes Local Elections	Yes	No	Yes	No
Observations	6,252	6,252	6,200	6,200

A.5 Additional Difference-in-Differences Tests of the Relationship Between Workload and Turnover

This section includes regressions testing alternative specifications of the relationship between workload and turnover, all employing at the minimum jurisdiction and year fixed effects. Table A.5 uses a four-year definition of election official turnover. Table A.6 measures workload as the average of the first and second lag of Election Days administered, and Table A.7 measures workload as the second and third lag of Election Days administered. Table A.8 subsets the dataset to jurisdictions in states with a high level of responsibility for administering municipal elections. Table A.9 subsets the dataset to counties. Tables A.10 and A.11 use 2 and 4 year definitions of turnover, respectively, and employ state fixed effects instead of state-by-year fixed effects. Finally, Table A.12 uses workload data calculated by manually collecting Election Dates from the 400 most populous counties' election websites. Across most specifications, I fail to identify a clear positive relationship between higher workloads and more turnover. While three tests result in a statistically significant positive relationship, two result in a significant relationship in the opposite direction. The sum total of evidence suggests a null relationship between workload and turnover.

Table A.5: Effect of Election Workload on Turnover, 2014–2020

	2-Year Turnover			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elections Administered over Past 4 Years	−0.004	0.001	−0.008	−0.004
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Jurisdiction FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Method	Criteria	Criteria	Stayer	Stayer
Includes Local Elections	Yes	No	Yes	No
Observations	9,980	9,980	12,518	12,518

Table A.6: Effect of Election Workload on Turnover, 2014–2020 (Alt Lag Definition)

	Previous 2-Year Turnover			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elections Administered over Past 2 Years	0.0004	−0.0003	0.0001	−0.002
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Jurisdiction FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Method	Criteria	Criteria	Stayer	Stayer
Includes Local Elections	Yes	No	Yes	No
Observations	14,970	14,970	18,777	18,777

Table A.7: Effect of Election Workload on Turnover, 2014–2020 (Prior Lag Definition)

	Previous 2-Year Turnover			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elections Administered in Prior 2 Years	0.004	0.003	−0.001	−0.003
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Jurisdiction FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Method	Criteria	Criteria	Stayer	Stayer
Includes Local Elections	Yes	No	Yes	No
Observations	9,980	9,980	12,518	12,518

Table A.8: Effect of Election Workload on Turnover, 2014–2020 (High Municipal Responsibility)

	2-Year Turnover			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elections Administered over Past 2 Years	−0.011	−0.008	−0.009	−0.004
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Jurisdiction FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Method	Criteria	Criteria	Stayer	Stayer
Includes Local Elections	Yes	No	Yes	No
Observations	10,959	10,959	14,721	14,721

Table A.9: Effect of Election Workload on Turnover, 2014–2020 (Excluding muni)

| | 2-Year Turnover | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elections Administered over Past 2 Years	−0.010	−0.008	−0.012	−0.014
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Jurisdiction FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Method	Criteria	Criteria	Stayer	Stayer
Includes Local Elections	Yes	No	Yes	No
Observations	8,964	8,964	9,057	9,057

Table A.10: Effect of Election Workload on Turnover, 2014–2020 (Year FE)

| | 2-Year Turnover | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elections Administered over Past 2 Years	0.008	0.014	0.007	0.011
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Jurisdiction FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Method	Criteria	Criteria	Stayer	Stayer
Includes Local Elections	Yes	No	Yes	No
Observations	14,970	14,970	18,777	18,777

Table A.11: Effect of Election Workload on Turnover, 2014–2020 (Year FE)

| | 2-Year Turnover | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Elections Administered over Past 4 Years	0.011	0.004	0.005	0.008
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Jurisdiction FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Method	Criteria	Criteria	Stayer	Stayer
Includes Local Elections	Yes	No	Yes	No
Observations	9,980	9,980	12,518	12,518

Table A.12: Effect of Election Workload on Turnover, 2014–2020 (Manual Collection)

| | 2-Year Turnover | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Prior Elections Administered	0.002	−0.015	−0.026	−0.023
	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Jurisdiction FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year x State FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Method	Manual	Manual	Manual	Manual
Lags	Past 2	Past 4	Past 2 Alt	Past 2 Prior
Includes Local Elections	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	989	977	981	982